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RFRA Rights Revisited: Substantial 
Burdens, Judicial Competence, and the 
Religious Nonprofit Cases 
Scott W. Gaylord* 
“I am the King’s good servant, but God’s first.” 




The most recent challenge to the free exercise of religion is here.  And while 
it stems from the same legislation that prompted the action in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. – the contraception mandate under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”) – it raises unique and equally important issues: 
what constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, and who gets to 
decide (the religious adherents or the courts)?  In Hobby Lobby, the government 
contended that for-profit corporations could not exercise religion and, conse-
quently, could not avail themselves of the broad protection afforded to free exer-
cise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).  In the seven reli-
gious nonprofit cases that the Supreme Court of the United States recently con-
sidered and vacated in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016), the government 
acknowledged that RFRA applies to religious nonprofits but alleged that the ACA 
does not substantially burden the free exercise of these religious organizations.  
In particular, the government argued that the accommodation to the contracep-
tion mandate (which permits religious nonprofits to avoid directly providing 
coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptives and sterilization procedures by 
giving notice to their insurance issuers or third-party administrators (“TPAs”) 
that the religious organizations object to providing such coverage – the “Ac-
commodation”) does not burden, let alone substantially burden, the religious 
nonprofits’ exercise of religion. 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Zubik, eight circuit courts of ap-
peals had sided with the government, instructing the religious nonprofits that 
their sincerely held belief – that the accommodation makes them complicit in a  
* The author is a Professor of Law at Elon University School of Law, where he  
teaches First Amendment and Constitutional Law.  The author had primary 
responsibility for preparing an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the religious nonprofit cases challenging the government’s accommodation 
to the Health and Human Services mandate.  The amicus brief addresses many of the 
legal issues discussed in this Article. 
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grave moral wrong (i.e., the provision of contraceptives and abortifacients) – was 
incorrect because the ACA, not any actions by the religious nonprofits, is the 
legal cause of the insurance issuers’ and TPAs’ obligation to provide such cover-
age.  Under the majority’s “Pontius Pilate” defense, the Accommodation “wash-
es the hands” of religious nonprofits, cleansing them of any legal or moral re-
sponsibility for providing the objectionable coverage.  As a result, the religious 
nonprofits cannot meet their burden under RFRA because the Accommodation 
does not substantially burden their exercise of religion.  Only the Eighth Circuit 
had ruled for the religious nonprofits.  In Zubik, however, the Supreme Court 
vacated seven circuit court opinions favoring the government yet “expresse[d] no 
view on the merits of the cases.”  As a result, the circuit courts now have a sec-
ond chance to consider the scope of free exercise protection under RFRA and 
whether courts or religious practitioners have the right to determine when gov-
ernment-mandated actions actually contravene sincerely held religious beliefs. 
This Article contends that on remand, the circuit majority should join the 
Eighth Circuit and uphold the right of religious nonprofits to forego the notice 
required under the Accommodation.  Contrary to the majority’s claim, Hobby 
Lobby and Holt v. Hobbs preclude courts from deciding whether the ACA (or any 
other statute) actually burdens a religious adherent’s sincerely held beliefs.  Alt-
hough, as Chief Justice Marshall famously declared, “it is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to declare what the law is,” courts lack 
the authority and competence to declare what the religious commitments of a 
faith are and when those commitments are violated.  Under the Court’s free exer-
cise precedents, courts can determine only whether the government puts a reli-
gious practitioner to the choice of engaging in conduct that violates her beliefs or 
disobeying the government’s policy and facing “serious” consequences.  Reli-
gious and philosophical questions regarding moral complicity are left to reli-
gious adherents, not the courts.  As the Founders recognized, religious and moral 
questions transcend the legal, imposing a different – and higher – obligation on 
religious believers.  For religious adherents, only God (through a religious au-
thority determined in accordance with their sincere religious beliefs) can deter-
mine whether an action makes them complicit in sin.  Consequently, as the Court 
explained in Hobby Lobby, “question[s]” about moral complicity are ones “that 
the federal courts have no business addressing.” 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources 
of Oregon v. Smith,1 Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”) “to provide very broad protection for religious liberty.”2  In fact, 
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that RFRA “provide[s] greater protec-
tion for religious exercise than is available under the First Amendment.”3  As 
a result, plaintiffs claiming that a federal statute or policy violates their reli-
gious beliefs typically rely on RFRA or its sister statute, the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), which “imposes the same 
general test as RFRA but on a more limited category of governmental ac-
tions,”4 instead of the Free Exercise Clause.5  To secure the “expansive pro-
tection for religious liberty” under RFRA and RLUIPA, though, plaintiffs 
have the initial burden of showing both that “the relevant exercise of religion 
is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief” and that the federal statute or 
policy “substantially burdened that exercise of religion.”6  If the plaintiff es-
tablishes that the federal government substantially burdened its sincerely held 
religious belief, then the burden shifts to the government to “demonstrate[] 
that application of the burden to the person – (1) is in furtherance of a com-
pelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of further-
ing that compelling governmental interest.”7  If the government meets its 
burden, then the plaintiff’s claim fails; if not, the plaintiff is entitled to an 
exemption from the statute or policy. 
Hobby Lobby is perhaps best known for its resolution of the threshold 
(and at the time, entirely novel) question: whether for-profit corporations 
could exercise religion.8  In its 5-4 decision, the Court ultimately held that  
 1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012), as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. 
Ct. 853 (2015). 
 2. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014). 
 3. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 859–60. 
 4. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761. 
 5. As initially enacted, RFRA applied to federal and state action.  Id.  See also 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–34 (1997) (stating that Congress exceed-
ed its section 5 authority because “[t]he stringent test RFRA demands . . . far ex-
ceed[ed] any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise 
Clause as interpreted in Smith”), superseded by statute, §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5, as rec-
ognized in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761. 
 6. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 860, 862. 
 7. See § 2000bb-1(b); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761; Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863. 
 8. See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Colo. 2012) 
(“These arguments [regarding the free exercise rights of for-profit corporations] pose 
difficult questions of first impression.”), aff’d, 542 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 2013); 
Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 741 (S.D. Ill. 
2012), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013).  
See also Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 
(D.D.C. 2012) (stating that “whether for-profit corporations can exercise religion 
4
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corporations could exercise religion because “protecting the free-exercise 
rights of corporations . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who 
own and control those companies.”9  This holding was important because it 
meant “a federal regulation’s restriction on the activities of a for-profit close-
ly held corporation must comply with RFRA.”10  That is, because corpora-
tions were “persons” under RFRA, they were entitled to the “broad protec-
tion” that RFRA affords free exercise.11  But Hobby Lobby does not resolve 
the central issue in the religious nonprofit cases, because the substantial bur-
den analysis in that case was straightforward.  As the majority noted: 
If the owners comply with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be 
facilitating abortions, and if they do not comply, they will pay a very 
heavy price – as much as $1.3 million per day, or about $475 million 
per year, in the case of one of the companies.  If these consequences 
do not amount to a substantial burden, it is hard to see what would.12 
Similarly, in Holt v. Hobbs, the Court unanimously held that the Arkan-
sas Department of Corrections’s grooming policy, which required a Muslim 
prisoner to shave his beard, substantially burdened his sincerely held religious 
beliefs: “If petitioner contravenes that policy and grows his beard, he will 
face serious disciplinary action.  Because the grooming policy puts petitioner 
to this choice, it substantially burdens his religious exercise.”13  Thus, Hobby 
Lobby and Holt presented situations in which the Court easily concluded that 
the government’s policies imposed a substantial burden on the free exercise 
of religion. 
The substantial burden analysis has proven to be more difficult – and 
certainly more contentious – in the religious nonprofit cases.  While the gov-
ernment has not challenged the general ability of religious nonprofits to exer-
cise religion (as it did with respect to for-profits in Hobby Lobby), it has ar-
gued that the accommodation (the “Accommodation”) to the Health and Hu-
man Services (“HHS”) Mandate does not burden, let alone substantially bur-
 
within the meaning of the RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause” is an “unresolved 
question”); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 
(E.D. Pa. 2013) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit have had occasion 
to decide whether for-profit, secular corporations possess the religious rights held by 
individuals.”), aff’d sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded 
sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), rev’d sub 
nom. Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., No. 13-1144, 2014 WL 4467879 (3d Cir. Aug. 5, 2014). 
 9. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
 10. Id. at 2775. 
 11. See id. at 2767–68. 
 12. Id. at 2759. 
 13. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). 
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den, the free exercise rights of the religious nonprofits.14  Under the govern-
ment’s view, the ACA imposes a legal obligation on insurance issuers and 
third-party administrators (“TPAs”) to provide the required coverage once a 
religious nonprofit avails itself of the Accommodation and opts out of provid-
ing all (or some) of the FDA-approved contraceptives and sterilization proce-
dures.15  And eight of the nine circuit courts to consider the issue have agreed 
with the government – which might make one think this is yet another easy 
case, like Hobby Lobby and Holt.16 
Unlike the Court’s prior RFRA cases, however, the consolidated cases 
raise different – yet equally important – questions regarding who gets to de-
cide whether a government policy substantially burdens a religious adherent’s 
free exercise and what the proper scope of free exercise is under RFRA.  
Does the substantial burden prong require courts to make an objective deter-
mination as to the nature of the burden imposed on religious objectors, as the 
majority of circuits have held?  Or does it refer instead to the nature of the 
 
 14. See Brief for the Respondents at 33, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 
(2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191), 2016 WL 
537623, at *33. 
 15. Id. at 37–38. 
 16. See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 
F.3d 1151, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Bur-
well, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) (agreeing with the government), and cert. granted in part 
136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. 
Ct. 1557 (2016) [hereinafter Zubik III] (per curiam); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (agreeing with the gov-
ernment), cert. granted sub nom. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Burwell, 
136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik 
III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557; E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 
2015) (agreeing with the government), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), and va-
cated sub nom. Univ. of Dallas v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 2008 (2016), and vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557; Grace Schs. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 
788, 807 (7th Cir. 2015) (agreeing with the government), vacated sub nom. Diocese 
of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 2010 (2016), and vacated, 136 S. 
Ct. 2011 (2016); Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207, 218 (2d Cir. 
2015) (agreeing with the government), vacated, No. 15-1100, 2016 WL 816249 (U.S. 
May 23, 2016); Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 
F.3d 422, 437 (3d Cir. 2015) (agreeing with the government), cert. granted in part 
sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) [hereinafter Zubik II], and cert. 
granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557; Mich. Catholic Conference & Cath-
olic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372, 390 (6th Cir. 2014) (agreeing with the 
government), vacated sub nom. Mich. Catholic Conference v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 
1914 (2015); Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1129 (11th Cir. 2016) (agreeing with the govern-
ment).  See also Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 801 
F.3d 927, 936 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. 
CNS Int’l Ministries, No. 15-775, 2016 WL 2842448 (U.S. May 16, 2016). 
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pressure that the government places on a religious adherent to take an action 
that she sincerely believes violates her religious views?  And how much def-
erence should be given to a plaintiff’s claim that a government policy sub-
stantially burdens her belief?  The circuit court split highlights markedly dif-
ferent interpretations of the burden RFRA imposes on religious objectors, as 
well as conflicting understandings of the scope of protection afforded the free 
exercise of religion under RFRA. 
And Zubik did nothing to resolve this uncertainty.  In its per curiam 
opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the courts of appeals 
(all of which had been victories for the government) but expressly stated that 
the Court “expresses no view on the merits of the cases.”17  Specifically, the 
Court emphasized that it was not “decid[ing] whether petitioners’ religious 
exercise has been substantially burdened, whether the Government has a 
compelling interest, or whether the current regulations are the least restrictive 
means of serving that interest.”18  The Court simply instructed the circuit 
courts on remand to give the parties “an opportunity to arrive at an approach 
going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the 
same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans receive 
full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.”19 
Given that the Supreme Court did not reach the merits, on remand the 
government is apt to argue once again that courts must make an objective 
determination as to the nature of the burden imposed on religious adherents.20  
Such independent review is necessary to avoid conflating the sincerity of 
belief and substantial burden prongs, as well as to ensure that courts retain a 
role in deciding whether the government action actually infringes on the free 
exercise of the plaintiffs’ religion.21  According to the government, a careful 
review of the Accommodation reveals that the ACA is the legal cause of the 
insurance issuers and TPAs providing the contraceptive coverage to which 
the religious nonprofits object.22  As a result, the nonprofits’ religious beliefs 
are not actually burdened.23  The religious nonprofits’ real objection is to the 
government’s requiring and arranging for coverage to be provided through 
third parties.  But the Court’s free exercise precedents preclude the religious 
nonprofits’ objecting when the government makes arrangements to provide 
 
 17. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1560. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Little Sisters of the Poor, 794 F.3d at 1176; Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 
247; Grace Schs., 801 F.3d at 805. 
 21. Little Sisters of the Poor, 794 F.3d at 1176 (“If plaintiffs could assert and 
establish that a burden is substantial without any possibility of judicial scrutiny, the 
word substantial would become wholly devoid of independent meaning.  Further-
more, accepting any burden alleged by Plaintiffs as substantial would improperly 
conflate the determination that a religious belief is sincerely held with the determina-
tion that a law or policy substantially burdens religious exercise.”) (citations omitted). 
 22. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 14, at 25–26. 
 23. Id. at 25. 
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coverage directly through the insurance issuers or TPAs.  According to the 
government, signing Form 700, or giving notice directly to HHS, is a de min-
imis act and neither causes nor facilitates coverage.24  The religious nonprof-
its, therefore, cannot meet their initial burden under RFRA to show a substan-
tial burden on their religious exercise and, consequently, are not entitled to 
relief from the Accommodation.25  They must either provide the coverage 
directly, give notice using Form 700 or directly to HHS, or pay the penalties 
set forth in the ACA.26 
This Article contends that the lower courts have seriously misconstrued 
RFRA’s substantial burden analysis and arrogated the authority to tell reli-
gious believers when government-mandated actions contravene their sincere-
ly held beliefs.27  Specifically, these courts have informed the religious non-
profit organizations that, because the ACA is the legal cause of the obligation 
of insurance issuers and TPAs to provide contraceptive coverage, giving no-
tice under the Accommodation does not make the religious nonprofits com-
plicit in immoral conduct – despite their sincere belief to the contrary that 
such notice enables and facilitates the provision of contraceptive and steriliza-
tion services.  By resolving the legal question (whether the ACA is the legal 
cause of contraceptive coverage), the lower courts claim to obviate the moral 
question (whether giving notice makes a religious adherent complicit in sin).  
On this view, instead of looking to the tenets of their faith or their religious 
leaders, religious nonprofits must look to the courts to determine if a govern-
ment-mandated action “wash[es their] hands of any involvement” in wrong-
doing.28 
There are at least two fundamental problems with permitting courts to 
tell religious adherents what does or does not violate their moral and religious 
beliefs.  After providing an overview in Part II of the ACA, as well as the 
constitutional and statutory framework that applies to free exercise claims, 
Part III explores the first problem – that the circuit majority’s interpretation is 
inconsistent with the substantial burden analysis that the Court set forth in 
Hobby Lobby and Holt v. Hobbs.  Contrary to the circuit court majority, 
RFRA defines “substantial burden” in relation to the force or pressure that the 
 
 24. See Little Sisters of the Poor, 794 F.3d at 1173–74; Priests for Life, 772 F.3d 
at 249; Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207, 220 (2d Cir. 2015), va-
cated, No. 15-1100, 2016 WL 816249 (U.S. May 23, 2016). 
 25. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 14, at 33–34. 
 26. See Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 
927, 936 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. CNS 
Int’l Ministries, No. 15-775, 2016 WL 2842448 (U.S. May 16, 2016). 
 27. See Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 
422, 442 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[N]ow that we have dispelled the notion that the self-
certification procedure is burdensome, we need not consider whether the burden is 
substantial . . . .”), cert. granted in part sub nom. Zubik II, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), and 
cert. granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and vacated 
and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
 28. Id. at 441. 
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government places on a religious believer, not on a court’s allegedly objec-
tive determination that a required action does or does not impose an actual 
burden on religious adherents.  The Supreme Court’s analysis of the plain-
tiff’s burden in Hobby Lobby and Holt confirms that the government substan-
tially burdens the exercise of religion when it puts a religious adherent to the 
choice of either (1) following the government’s directive and engaging in 
conduct that violates her sincerely held religious beliefs or (2) contravening 
that directive and facing significant penalties (as in Hobby Lobby) or disci-
pline (as in Holt).29  Because (1) it is undisputed that giving notice contra-
venes the petitioners’ sincerely held religious beliefs (facilitating the provi-
sion of contraceptive services by authorizing the use of their healthcare in-
formation and infrastructure) and (2) the religious nonprofits face the same 
penalties under the ACA as Hobby Lobby and Conestoga if the religious 
nonprofits do not give notice under the Accommodation, the Accommodation 
imposes a substantial burden on the religious nonprofits’ exercise of religion. 
Moreover, the government and circuit majority completely ignore the 
Court’s right of association cases, even though the Court has instructed that 
“[t]he Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship 
that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment.”30  
These right-of-association cases demonstrate that courts should defer to a 
plaintiff’s assertion about what her beliefs are and whether a government-
mandated action contravenes those beliefs.  In Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale31 and Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La 
Follette,32 the Court did not question the associations’ claims about what their 
beliefs were or the types of actions that conflicted with those beliefs, recog-
nizing the need to allow associations – and not the government or the courts – 
to determine the nature and scope of their beliefs, even if (or perhaps espe-
cially when) those beliefs run counter to the government’s views. 
Part IV evaluates the second problem with the majority’s position – 
namely, that the lower courts impermissibly conflate the legal and religious 
realms, assuming the power to tell religious adherents that their sincerely held 
beliefs about moral complicity are wrong.  As James Madison eloquently 
stated in his Memorial and Remonstrance, though, the two realms are dis-
tinct: 
[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth “that religion, or 
the duty which we owe our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, 
can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or vio-
lence.”  The religion, then, of every man must be left to the conviction 
 
 29. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76 (2014); 
Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). 
 30. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992). 
 31. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 32. 450 U.S. 107 (1981). 
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and conscience of every man: and that it is the right of every man to 
exercise it as these may dictate.33 
Given the “broad protection” afforded the exercise of religion under 
RFRA, the government cannot “force” religious adherents to violate their 
sincerely held religious beliefs (without satisfying RFRA’s “exceptionally 
demanding” least-restrictive-means test),34 and courts cannot decide for such 
believers that certain government-mandated actions do not significantly inter-
fere with their sincerely held religious beliefs.  This is why the Supreme 
Court has “[r]epeatedly and in many different contexts . . . warned that courts 
must not presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim”35 or 
“in effect tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed.”36  But that is precise-
ly what the lower courts have done in the religious nonprofit cases. 
II.  THE RELIGIOUS NONPROFITS’ CHALLENGES TO THE 
ACCOMMODATION TO THE HHS MANDATE 
As the seven religious nonprofit cases recently argued before the Su-
preme Court of the United States demonstrate,37 Hobby Lobby did not resolve 
 
 33. JAMES MADISON, Citizens’ “Memorial and Remonstrance” to Virginia, in 
THE JAMES MADISON PAPERS, 1723 TO 1859 1 (photo. reprint) (1785), 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mjm.02_0449_0450/?sp=1. 
 34. See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864. 
 35. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990), 
superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (2012), as recognized in Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 853. 
 36. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
 37. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 
1151 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. 
Ct. 445 (2015), and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Zubik III 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam); Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Wash. v. Sebelius, 19 F. Supp. 3d 48 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part sub nom. Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 
at 1557; E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 
136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), and vacated sub nom. Univ. of Dallas v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 
2008 (2016), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557; 
Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 
2014), cert. granted sub nom. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Burwell, 136 
S. Ct. 444 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 
136 S. Ct. at 1557; Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 
F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part sub nom. Zubik II, 136 S. Ct. 444 
(2015) and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), 
and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557; S. Nazarene Univ. 
v. Sebelius, No. CIV-13-1015-F, 2013 WL 6804265 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2013), 
rev’d sub nom. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 
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all of the issues regarding the ACA’s impact on the free exercise rights of 
religious adherents under RFRA.  To date, nine circuits have considered fif-
teen challenges to the government’s proposed Accommodation to the HHS 
Mandate.38  According to the government, the Accommodation permits reli-
gious nonprofits to opt-out of the HHS Mandate simply by providing notice 
to their insurance issuers or TPAs, stating that the religious nonprofit objects 
to providing all FDA-approved contraception and sterilization procedures.39  
The religious nonprofits, not surprisingly, take a different view.  According to 
these organizations, the Accommodation requires them to facilitate or to ena-
ble the exact same coverage to which these groups originally objected under 
the ACA.40  That is, under the religious nonprofits’ position, the proposed 
Accommodation fails to accommodate their religious beliefs because it forces 
them to choose between and among impermissible options.  The religious 
nonprofits must either (1) provide all FDA-approved contraception and steri-
lization procedures, (2) give notice that (in their view) effectively triggers or 
facilitates the same coverage by and through their preexisting insurance plan, 
or (3) pay the substantial penalties set forth in the ACA, which amounted to 
“as much as $475 million per year in the case of Hobby Lobby.”41  The first 
two options violate the religious nonprofits’ sincerely held beliefs, while the 
third option is so prohibitively expensive that it forces them to pick one of the 
first two options (thereby infringing on the same beliefs) or go out of busi-
ness. 
 
F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 
1557; Zubik v. Sebelius, 983 F. Supp. 2d 576 (W.D. Pa. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Gene-
va Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015), 
vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557. 
 38. In addition to the seven cases consolidated on appeal and vacated in Zubik 
III, religious nonprofits have filed actions in: Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 
796 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, No. 15-1100, 2016 WL 816249 (U.S. May 23, 
2016); Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2006 
(2016); Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122 (11th Cir. 2016); Grace Schs. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 788 
(7th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. v. Burwell, 
136 S. Ct. 2010 (2016), and vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2011 (2016); Mich. Catholic Confer-
ence & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated sub 
nom. Mich. Catholic Conference v. Burwell, No. 15-1131, 2016 WL 932712 (U.S. 
May 23, 2016); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 801 
F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. CNS 
Int’l Ministries, No. 15-775, 2016 WL 2842448 (U.S. May 16, 2016); Univ. of Notre 
Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016); 
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 39. Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands 
Prevention Coverage for Women’s Health and Well-Being, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited July 20, 2016). 
 40. See cases cited supra notes 37–38. 
 41. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
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To date, eight circuits – the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. – have ruled for the government.42  Only the Eighth Cir-
cuit has held for the religious nonprofits, leaving one to wonder whether the 
religious nonprofits have a viable free exercise claim.43  The fact that the 
Supreme Court vacated seven of the circuit court decisions favoring the gov-
ernment might suggest that the Eighth Circuit was on to something.  Yet the 
Court expressly disclaimed resolving any of the underlying issues in the case, 
leaving the circuit courts, as the concurrence noted, “[F]ree to reach the same 
conclusion or a different one on each of the questions presented by these cas-
es.”44 
Upon first inspection, though, the almost unanimous support for the 
government’s position seems surprising given the “expansive protection for 
religious liberty” under RFRA and RLUIPA.45  After all, the religious non-
profits’ claims are novel and implicate difficult questions about complicity in 
wrongdoing, as well as the court’s competence to answer such questions.  Yet 
despite the fact that the Supreme Court has never addressed the specific is-
sues in these consolidated cases, a resounding majority of the circuit courts 
has held for the government. 
On remand, then, the courts of appeals must reconsider whether the Su-
preme Court’s RFRA cases provide such overwhelming support for the gov-
ernment’s position.  In so doing, the lower courts must determine what is the 
appropriate free exercise framework set forth in these cases and how it ap-
plies to the sincerely held beliefs of religious nonprofits.  A careful review of 
the Accommodation to the ACA, the burden-shifting analysis that the Court 
articulated in Hobby Lobby and Holt, and the government’s admission that 
“challenged procedures ‘for employers with insured plans could be modified 
to operate in the manner posited in the Court’s order’”46 demonstrates the 
need for the circuit court majority to reevaluate its prior decisions.  And this 
Article is meant to guide them – as well as practitioners and courts in other 
RFRA cases – by walking through and applying the proper RFRA analysis 
under Hobby Lobby and Holt. 
Passed in March 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act47 
has proven to be the gift that keeps on giving for constitutional law scholars 
and attorneys, requiring courts to resolve challenges under the Commerce, 
 
 42. See cases cited supra note 16. 
 43. See Sharpe Holdings, Inc., 801 F.3d at 936. 
 44. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1562 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (per 
curiam); see also id. (stating that “[l]ower courts . . . should not construe either to-
day’s per curiam or our order of March 29, 2016, as signals of where this Court 
stands”). 
 45. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 860 (2015). 
 46. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1560 (quoting Supplemental Brief for the Respond-
ents at 14–15, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-
1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191), 2016 WL 1445915, at *14–15). 
 47. Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 18001–18122 
(West 2016). 
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Spending, Taxing,48 Origination,49 Free Speech, and Free Exercise Clauses,50 
as well as issues of statutory construction under the ACA51 and RFRA.52  
Among other things, the ACA requires most employers with fifty or more 
full-time employees to offer “a group health plan or group health insurance 
coverage” that provides “minimum essential coverage.”53  These employers 
must provide no-cost coverage for women employees for “such additional 
preventative care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guide-
lines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration” (the 
“HRSA”).54  The HRSA, which is part of HHS, turned to the Institute of 
Medicine (the “IOM”) to define which preventative care and screenings 
would be required under the ACA.  Under the comprehensive guidelines that 
HHS promulgated, most employers with fifty or more full-time employees 
are required to provide all FDA-approved contraceptives, sterilization proce-
dures, and related education and counseling.55  A plan or issuer that fails to 
provide the required coverage under the HHS guidelines is subject to substan-
tial tax penalties under the Internal Revenue Code,56 penalties totaling “as 
much as $475 million per year in the case of Hobby Lobby.”57 
Although the ACA exempts “religious employers” from the HHS Man-
date, that term is defined somewhat narrowly to include only churches, their 
integrated auxiliaries, conventions or associations of churches, and the exclu-
sively religious activities of any religious order.58  The definition does not 
 
 48. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 49. See generally Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs,. 760 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 50. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 
794 F.3d 1151, 1196–1205 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene 
Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 
(2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per 
curiam). 
 51. See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 52. See generally, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014). 
 53. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2) (2012); 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2) (West 
2016). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 55. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18024; 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2016); Women’s Preventive 
Services Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2016). 
 56. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1) (stating that employers that do not pro-
vide the coverage required under the HHS Mandate are subject to a penalty of $100 
per day for each affected individual); 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(c)(1) (noting that em-
ployers subject to the HHS Mandate that do not offer health coverage and have at 
least one full-time employee who has certified to the employer under § 1411 of the 
ACA is subject to a penalty of $2000 per employee each year). 
 57. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 58. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2016).  The ACA also exempts employers with 
fewer than fifty employees and those providing “grandfathered health plans,” i.e., 
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include religious schools, religious hospitals, and the non-religious activities 
of religious orders, such as the Little Sisters of the Poor.  Instead of exempt-
ing such organizations, the Departments of Labor, HHS, and the Treasury 
(the “Departments”) provided “accommodations” for certain religious groups 
as part of the final rules implementing the HHS Mandate (the “Final 
Rules”).59  To qualify as an “eligible organization” subject to the Accommo-
dation, an organization must (1) oppose providing coverage under the HHS 
Mandate on account of religious objections, (2) be organized and operate as a 
nonprofit entity, (3) hold itself out as a religious organization, and (4) self-
certify that it satisfies the first three criteria by giving notice pursuant to the 
procedures specified in the Final Rules.60  To self-certify, eligible organiza-
tions originally had to execute and deliver a specific form, EBSA Form 700 
(“Form 700”), to their insurers, stating that the organization is eligible for the 
Accommodation.61  Upon receiving Form 700, the organization’s insurance 
issuer is required to “assume sole responsibility for providing separate pay-
ments for contraceptive services directly for plan participants and beneficiar-
ies, without cost sharing, premium, fee, or other charge to plan participants or 
beneficiaries or to the eligible organization or its plan.”62 
Several religious nonprofits challenged the Accommodation, arguing 
that submitting Form 700 substantially burdened their exercise of religion by 
forcing them to provide information about their insurance plans that led to 
their insurance issuers effectively providing the same objectionable coverage 
by and through the religious nonprofits’ plans.  That is, the religious nonprof-
its argued that Form 700 facilitated or enabled the provision of contraceptives 
and sterilization procedures, thereby violating their sincerely held religious 
beliefs.  In fact, Wheaton College, a Christian college in Wheaton, Illinois, 
applied for and received an injunction from the Supreme Court, prohibiting 
the government from enforcing the HHS Mandate.63  Pursuant to the Court’s 
order pending appeal, instead of using Form 700, Wheaton College could 
avoid the requirements of the HHS Mandate by giving notice directly to 
HHS: 
 
plans that existed prior to March 23, 2010, and that have not made specific changes 
after that date.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 18011(a), 
(e) and 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(c)(2)).  Neither of these exemptions is implicated in the 
religious nonprofit cases. 
 59. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 39870, 39874–78 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 
C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156). 
 60. Id. at 39870, 39875. 
 61. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 
Fed. Reg. 51092, 51094 (Aug. 27, 2014) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pts. 
2510, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 62. 78 Fed. Reg. at 39876; see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(2)(i) (2016). 
 63. See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014). 
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If the applicant informs the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
in writing that it is a nonprofit organization that holds itself out as re-
ligious and has religious objections to providing coverage for contra-
ceptive services, the [Departments] are enjoined from enforcing 
against the applicant the challenged provisions of the [ACA] and re-
lated regulations pending final disposition of appellate review.  To 
meet the condition for injunction pending appeal, the applicant need 
not use the [Form 700], and need not send copies to health insurance 
issuers or third-party administrators.64 
The Court noted, though, that “[n]othing in this order precludes the 
Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it neces-
sary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage under the 
Act.”65 
Based on the Court’s order in Wheaton College and a similar injunction 
in Little Sisters of the Poor,66 the Departments issued interim final regula-
tions, altering the accommodation process set forth in the Final Rules.67  
These regulations provided an alternative means of giving notice if a religious 
nonprofit objected to providing some or all of the contraceptive services re-
quired under the HHS Mandate.  According to the modified procedure: 
[A]n eligible organization may notify HHS in writing of its religious 
objection to coverage of all or a subset of contraceptive services.  The 
notice must include the name of the eligible organization and the basis 
on which it qualifies for an accommodation; its objection based on 
sincerely held religious beliefs to providing coverage of some or all 
contraceptive services . . . ; the plan name and type . . . ; and the name 
and contact information of any of the plan’s third party administrators 
and health insurance issuers.68 
Upon receiving such notice, HHS is required to send a separate notice to 
the insurance issuer, informing it that the eligible organization objects and 
that the issuer must “[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive coverage from the 
group health insurance coverage provided in connection with the group health 
plan[] and . . . [p]rovide separate payments for any contraceptive services 
required to be covered.”69  The insurance issuer is then responsible for 
providing separate payments for contraceptive services directly for plan par-
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 
1022 (2014). 
 67. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 
Fed. Reg. 51092, 51092 (Aug. 27, 2014) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pts. 
2510, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 68. Id. at 51094–95. 
 69. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(2)(i) (2016). 
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ticipants and beneficiaries without cost sharing or other charge to the partici-
pants and their beneficiaries.70 
According to the government, the Accommodation at issue in the reli-
gious nonprofits cases is meant to lift or alleviate the burden that the HHS 
Mandate imposes on certain religious groups that do not qualify as “religious 
employers” under the ACA.71  The information under Form 700, or the alter-
native notice specified in the interim final regulations, is “the minimum in-
formation necessary . . . to determine which entities are covered by the ac-
commodation, to administer the accommodation, and to implement” the gov-
ernment’s policy.72  The religious nonprofits contend that providing such 
information makes them complicit in a grave moral wrong, namely the provi-
sion of the contraception and sterilization services for which they made sure 
not to contract when securing coverage for their employees in the first 
place.73  As it turns out, determining whether the religious nonprofits or the 
government should win depends on the scope of protection afforded the exer-
cise of religion under the Constitution and RFRA. 
A.  Overview of the Constitutional and Statutory Frameworks for Free 
Exercise Claims 
Passed in 1993 in response to the Court’s decision in Smith, RFRA 
marked a significant shift in the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence.  Prior to 
Smith, the Court operated under what was known as the Sherbert/Yoder re-
gime, which provided for constitutionally mandated exemptions for religious 
adherents who could show that a government-mandated action infringed the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.74  To determine whether the 
government-required action violated the Free Exercise Clause, courts em-
ployed a balancing test “that took into account whether the challenged action 
imposed a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and if it did, whether 
it was needed to serve a compelling government interest.”75  Applying this 
standard in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court upheld the free exercise rights of an 
employee who was denied unemployment benefits after being fired for refus-
ing to work on the Sabbath, which she celebrated on Saturdays.76  The Court 
noted that denying her unemployment benefits “forces her to choose between 
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, 
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on 
the other hand.”77  Such a choice, the Court concluded, “[E]ffectively penal-
 
 70. 79 Fed. Reg. at 51092, 51095. 
 71. Id. at 51094. 
 72. Id. at 51095. 
 73. See cases cited supra notes 37–38. 
 74. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014). 
 75. Id. 
 76. 374 U.S. 398, 408–09 (1963). 
 77. Id. at 404. 
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izes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.”78  Similarly, in Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, the Court concluded that the State of Wisconsin could not re-
quire Amish children to remain in school until age sixteen, when their reli-
gion dictated that they spend their formative adolescent years learning about 
Amish values and beliefs through vocational education in the Amish commu-
nity.79  As in Sherbert, the Court emphasized that the government could not 
force the claimants to act in ways that were unquestionably at odds with the 
tenets of their faith, absent a compelling governmental interest.80 
Although Sherbert and Yoder provided some level of constitutional pro-
tection to free exercise claims, claimants won only occasionally under the 
balancing test.81  The Sherbert/Yoder regime, therefore, was considered to be 
strict in theory but “feeble” in fact, giving only modest protection to free ex-
ercise claims.82  But in Smith, the Court rejected “the balancing test set forth 
in Sherbert,”83 concluding that even this level of protection was excessive 
because it “would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious 
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”84 
The shift in the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence was pronounced.  In-
stead of a constitutional regime, under which the courts determined whether 
the Constitution mandated an exemption in a given case, the Smith Court 
implemented a statutory regime under which the legislature had broad discre-
tion to decide whether religious claimants should be exempt from neutral 
laws of general applicability.  Absent such a legislatively granted exemption, 
“neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even 
when not supported by a compelling government interest.”85 
The effect on individual claimants was readily apparent.  In Smith, the 
plaintiffs were members of the Native American Church who ingested a hal- 
 78. Id. at 406. 
 79. 406 U.S. 205, 210–11, 234–36 (1972). 
 80. See id. at 218 (“The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respond-
ents’ practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wis-
consin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform 
acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–61 (1982) (requiring an 
Amish employer to pay Social Security taxes despite his claim that the collection and 
payment of such taxes violated his religious exercise); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 
599, 601 (1961) (denying that Sunday closing laws impermissibly infringed on the 
claimants’ “ability . . . to earn a livelihood,” given that they observed the Sabbath on 
Saturday). 
 82. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND RELATED STATUTES: 
PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 369 (2005). 
 83. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990), 
superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (2012), as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
 84. Id. at 888. 
 85. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997), superseded by statute, §§ 
2000cc–2000cc-5, as recognized in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761. 
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lucinogenic drug, peyote, for sacramental purposes as part of a religious cer-
emony.86  Under Oregon law, those in possession of peyote and other drugs 
listed on Schedules I through V of the Controlled Substances Act87 are 
“guilty of a Class B Felony.”88  The plaintiffs’ employers fired them after 
learning about their sacramental – and, under Oregon law, illegal – use of 
peyote.89  The Employment Division denied the plaintiffs’ subsequent request 
for unemployment benefits because they had been fired for “misconduct,” 
i.e., violating Oregon law.90  Consistent with the Sherbert/Yoder balancing 
test, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to unem-
ployment benefits because the Oregon law impermissibly infringed on their 
free exercise rights.91 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.92  The Court reasoned, “[T]he 
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to com-
ply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that 
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
scribes).’”93  According to the Court, to allow everyone to opt out of neutral, 
generally applicable laws, whenever those laws allegedly conflict with reli-
gious practice, “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief 
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become 
a law unto himself.”94  Under such a regime, federal laws would become vol-
untary for religious believers, who could exempt themselves from general 
civic obligations (such as the payment of taxes, compulsory military service, 
health and safety regulations, drug and traffic laws, environmental laws, dis-
crimination laws, and a host of other obligations) by invoking the Free Exer-
cise Clause.95  The Court refused to adopt such a far-reaching rule.  Although 
legislation cannot specifically target religious conduct (because such laws 
would not be neutral and generally applicable) without satisfying strict scru-
tiny,96 merely having religious views or practices “which contradict the rele-
vant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the dis-
 
 86. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. 
 87. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 811–12. 
 88. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.752(1) (West 2016). 
 89. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
 90. See id. at 874. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 890. 
 93. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring)). 
 94. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)). 
 95. Id. at 889. 
 96. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 533 (1993) (“[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices be-
cause of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral and it is invalid unless it is 
justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”) 
(citation omitted). 
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charge of political responsibilities.”97  As a result, the Court upheld Oregon’s 
denial of unemployment benefits because that decision was based on plain-
tiffs using a drug prohibited under a neutral, generally applicable, Oregon 
law.98 
After Smith, a claim that a neutral, generally applicable law infringes the 
Free Exercise Clause is subject only to rational basis review.99  That is, in the 
wake of Smith, the Free Exercise Clause does not provide robust protection 
for religious exercise.100  Under the legislative model, Congress has broad 
discretion to pass neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden  
 97. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–95 (1940). See also 
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (plurality opinion) (upholding a Sun-
day-closing law against challenges by merchants who claimed that such laws bur-
dened their religious practice of closing on Saturday, the Sabbath for their particular 
faiths); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–61 (1982) (requiring an Amish em-
ployer to pay Social Security taxes despite his claim that the collection and payment 
of such taxes violated his religious exercise). 
 98. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (“It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to 
the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that 
are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic govern-
ment must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in 
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all reli-
gious beliefs.”). 
 99. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 
(10th Cir. 2006) (“[A] law that is both neutral and generally applicable need only be 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest to survive a constitutional 
challenge.”); WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 F. 
Supp. 2d 529, 541 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . confirmed that 
neutral laws, regulations and policies of general applicability that have only an inci-
dental effect on religion need not be held to a standard higher than rational basis scru-
tiny.”), aff’d sub nom. World Trade Ctr. Families for Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of 
New York, 359 F. App’x 177 (2d Cir. 2009); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
533–35 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Per-
sons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012), as recognized in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014). 
 100. By lowering the scrutiny review to rational basis, the Court significantly 
weakened the protection afforded the free exercise of religion under the First 
Amendment, thereby making it easier for the government to infringe religious prac-
tices.  Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.  As the President of the ACLU, Nadine Strossen, 
stated during a congressional hearing, “[i]n the aftermath of the Smith decision, it was 
easy to imagine how religious practices and institutions would have to abandon their 
beliefs in order to comply with generally applicable, neutral laws,” and “such familiar 
practices as . . . permitting religiously sponsored hospitals to decline to provide abor-
tion or contraception services” were at risk.  See Kevin C. Walsh, ACLU’s President 
on Forced Provision of “Contraception Services” Over Religious Objections – Circa 
1992, WALSHLAW (July 13, 2012), 
http://walshslaw142.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=7204035&item=4 (quoting Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 2797 Before the H. Sub-
comm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d 
Cong. 80–81 (1992) (statement of Nadine Strossen, President, ACLU)). 
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religion,101 as well laws that grant exemptions to religious adherents from 
such laws.  In rejecting the constitutional model of exemptions, the Smith 
majority acknowledged that the nature and scope of accommodations is a 
matter better left to the legislature than to the courts: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political pro-
cess will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that 
are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of dem-
ocratic government must be preferred to a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social im-
portance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 102 
On this view, a society is free to be “solicitous” of free exercise values 
through its legislation, permitting exemptions for some religious adherents 
but not others, or for religious believers generally.  But legislatures need not 
provide exemptions for individuals who object to neutral, generally applica-
ble laws on nonreligious grounds.  And while Smith was criticized widely, 
Congress moved quickly, using the legislative process to provide “very broad 
protection for religious liberty.”103 
Drawing on broad bipartisan support, Congress passed RFRA in 1993 to 
undo the effect of Smith on religious free exercise claims: “[RFRA was 
meant] to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner 
. . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . and to guarantee its application in all cases 
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”104  Under RFRA, 
the government can impose substantial burdens on religious exercise through 
a neutral law of general applicability only if the law survives a form of 
heightened scrutiny.105  That is, the government must “demonstrate[] that 
 
 101. The Smith majority compares the free exercise analysis to the analysis used 
for other First Amendment protections.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 876–77.   According to the 
majority, the collection of a general tax is no more an infringement on the free exer-
cise rights of religious adherents who believe that supporting organized government is 
sinful than it is on the freedom of the press to those publishing companies that must 
pay the tax to stay in business: “It is a permissible reading of the text, in the one case 
as in the other, to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the 
activity of printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a 
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been 
offended.”  Id. at 878. 
 102. Id. at 890. 
 103. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (stating 
that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability”). 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). 
 105. In Boerne, the Court determined that, as applied to state action, RFRA ex-
ceeded Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Boerne, 521 
U.S. at 513.  The Supreme Court held that Congress lacked authority to enact RFRA 
with respect to state action but upheld RFRA as to federal legislation.  Id. at 534–36.  
See also Nadia N. Sawicki, The Hollow Promise of Freedom of Conscience, 33 
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application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.”106 
Although Smith denied heightened constitutional protection against neu-
tral laws of general applicability that burdened religious exercise, the Court 
had no problem upholding the constitutionality of RFRA,107 which provided 
the same type of protection as Sherbert and Yoder.  But RFRA presented the 
Court with a new question: Did Congress intend to reinstitute the balancing 
test under the Sherbert/Yoder regime, which provided limited protection to 
the exercise of religion, or a more robust protection?  If the latter, then how 
much protection should RFRA accord laws that are alleged to burden reli-
gious exercise?  What constitutes a substantial burden on religion for RFRA 
purposes?  And what role should courts play in determining whether govern-
ment actions substantially burden religious exercise?  Hobby Lobby and Holt 
addressed the first question directly, concluding that RFRA and RLUIPA 
 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1389, 1412 (2012).  In the wake of Boerne, many states enacted 
state RFRAs – state legislation that mirrored the federal RFRA by providing height-
ened scrutiny review for substantial burdens on religious exercise that the state cre-
ates.  See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at State 
RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 466 (2010); W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the 
Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 666 (1999).  As a 
result, plaintiffs asserting free exercise claims now confront a patchwork of different 
standards depending on whether the claims assert Free Exercise Clause, federal 
RFRA, state RFRA, or state constitutional challenges.  Lund, supra, at 466–67; 
Durham, supra, at 666.  If a claim is made under the First Amendment that a neutral 
law of general applicability substantially burdens religiously motivated conduct, then 
rational basis applies.  Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1, 40 (2013).  If the same claim is made under a state or federal RFRA, then 
strict scrutiny applies.  Id.  Finally, if a state law is alleged to violate religious exer-
cise in a state without a state RFRA, then the state constitution determines the level of 
protection afforded religious exercise.  Id.  For a more detailed analysis of the “Free 
Exercise landscape” post-Smith, see Colombo, supra, at 41.  See also Eugene Volokh, 
Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions – A Research Agenda with Test 
Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 598 (1999) (explaining that state RFRAs “facially 
require strict scrutiny of all substantial burdens on religious practices”); Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, sec. 2(b) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb) (reinstating the strict scrutiny standard “in all cases 
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened”). 
 106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b). 
 107. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418, 423 (2006) (affirming under RFRA an injunction that prohibited the govern-
ment’s enforcing the Controlled Substances Act against a religious sect’s religious 
use of hoasca, a tea that contained a hallucinogen).  See also Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 
(noting that because “[v]alues that are protected against government interference 
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political 
process[,] . . . a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious 
belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well”). 
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provide “very broad”108 and “expansive protection for religious liberty.”109  
But these cases did not resolve the other questions, which are the central is-
sues in the religious nonprofit cases: (1) what constitutes a substantial burden 
under RFRA, and (2) who gets to decide whether there is such a burden, the 
courts or the religious objectors?  As the split between the circuit majority 
and the Eighth Circuit demonstrates, the answers to these questions directly 
determine whether religious nonprofits can meet their initial burden under 
RFRA. 
B.  The Circuit Split: Whether the Accommodation Substantially 
Burdens the Religoius Nonprofits’ Exercise of Religion 
Given the lack of case law addressing the substantial burden analysis 
under RFRA, federal courts have reached different conclusions regarding the 
effect the Accommodation has on the exercise of religion by religious non-
profits.  In the nine circuits that have decided cases to date, the courts have 
taken one of two positions: (1) the Accommodation does not burden the exer-
cise of religion because it enables religious nonprofits to opt-out of providing 
the objectionable coverage,110 or (2) the Accommodation impermissibly re-
quires religious nonprofits to choose between suffering serious consequences 
if they adhere to the tenets of their faith and violating their sincerely held 
religious beliefs if they conform to the government’s directive.111 
1.  The Circuit Court Majority Rejects the Religious Nonprofits’ 
Claims 
The seven religious nonprofit cases that the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States considered and vacated in Zubik v. Burwell came from four circuits 
– the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and District of Columbia.112  In each of these cases, 
the circuit court ruled in favor of the government, concluding that the reli-
gious nonprofits did not show that the Accommodation substantially bur-
dened their sincerely held religious beliefs.  The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits reached the same conclusion.113  As a result, eight circuit 
 
 108. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760. 
 109. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 860 (2015). 
 110. Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1148 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 111. See Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 
927, 945–46 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. 
CNS Int’l Ministries, No. 15-775, 2016 WL 2842448 (U.S. May 16, 2016). 
 112. See cases cited supra note 37. 
 113. See, e.g., Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2015), 
vacated, No. 15-1100, 2016 WL 816249 (U.S. May 23, 2016); Mich. Catholic Con-
ference & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated 
sub nom. Mich. Catholic Conference v. Burwell, No. 15-1131, 2016 WL 932712 
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courts have now ruled in favor of the government and denied that the reli-
gious nonprofits’ objection to the Accommodation fell within RFRA’s “broad 
protection” of religious exercise. 
Although there are some differences between and among the various re-
ligious nonprofit cases,114 the parties make the same general arguments, and 
the circuit courts in the majority adopt the same general analysis.  The reli-
gious nonprofits object to the contraception mandate, as well as the Accom-
modation, which enables them to give notice that they object on religious 
grounds to paying for the contraceptive services, but (from their perspective) 
that objection “triggers” or “facilitates” the provision of the same contracep-
tive services through their insurance issuers or TPAs.115  According to the 
religious nonprofits, giving the notice required under the Accommodation 
“requires them to be ‘complicit’ in sin.”116  Although the act of signing a ge-
neric form or giving notice directly to the government may not contradict 
their religious beliefs, signing Form 700 or giving the detailed notice under 
the Accommodation does because it provides the government with “the min-
imum information necessary . . . to determine which entities are covered by 
the accommodation, to administer the accommodation, and to implement” the 
 
(U.S. May 23, 2016); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016); Eternal Word, 818 F.3d at 1122. 
 114. For example, in Geneva College, the religious nonprofits argued that the 
Accommodation imposed a second substantial burden because it “improperly parti-
tions the Catholic Church by making the Dioceses eligible for the exemption, while 
the Catholic nonprofits [which have self-insured health plans through the Dioceses] 
can only qualify for the accommodation, even though all the Catholic entities share 
the same religious beliefs.”  Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 443 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part sub nom. Zubik II, 136 
S. Ct. 444 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 
(2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per 
curiam).  In Little Sisters of the Poor, the majority and dissent disagreed as to the 
effect of the ACA on self-insured plans.  See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the 
Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1210 (10th Cir. 2015) (Baldock, J., dissent-
ing in part), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 
(2015), and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557.  While the majority holds that the ACA is the 
legal cause in both situations, the dissent contends that the fact that the TPA is legally 
responsible for coverage only after a religious nonprofit opts out is a “critical distinc-
tion” that warrants a different result.  Id.  This Article focuses on the substantial bur-
den analysis under RFRA generally, given that (1) this is the central point of disa-
greement between the circuit majority and the Eighth Circuit, and (2) determining the 
proper substantial burden analysis is apt to have the biggest impact on RFRA litiga-
tion going forward. 
 115. See, e.g., Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 427. 
 116. Id. at 435.  See also Univ. Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 611 (“Because of its 
contractual relations with the two companies [providing coverage,] . . . Notre Dame 
claims to be complicit in the sin of contraception.”). 
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ACA’s contraception mandate.117  That is, according to the religious nonprof-
its, signing Form 700 is more than a de minimis act; it is a “necessary” com-
ponent of the government’s being able to provide the coverage to which the 
religious nonprofits object.118 
Across the board, the circuit court majority rejected the religious non-
profits’ claims.  Although deferring to the religious nonprofits as to the sin-
cerity of their religious beliefs, these courts have asserted the obligation to 
make an objective determination as to whether the Accommodation substan-
tially burdens those sincerely held beliefs: “Without testing the appellees’ 
religious beliefs, we must nonetheless objectively assess whether the appel-
lees’ compliance with the self-certification procedure does, in fact, trigger, 
facilitate, or make them complicit in the provision of contraceptive cover-
age.”119  Courts must make this type of objective determination (1) to give 
meaning to all of the statutory language relating to the plaintiffs’ burden un-
der RFRA and (2) to avoid conflating the sincerity of belief and substantial 
burden prongs.  As the Tenth Circuit noted in Little Sisters of the Poor, “If 
plaintiffs could assert and establish that a burden is ‘substantial’ without any 
possibility of judicial scrutiny, the word ‘substantial’ would become wholly 
devoid of independent meaning.”120  Moreover, “[A]ccepting any burden 
alleged by Plaintiffs as ‘substantial’ would improperly conflate the determi-
nation that a religious belief is sincerely held with the determination that a 
law or policy substantially burdens religious exercise.”121 
Before turning directly to the religious nonprofits’ specific claims, the 
circuit court majority distinguished the present cases from Hobby Lobby.122  
The for-profit companies challenged the contraception mandate because it 
presented two choices, both of which infringed their religious liberty.123  The 
companies were required to either provide the contraceptive coverage direct-
 
 117. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 
Fed. Reg. 51092, 51095 (Aug. 27, 2014) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pts. 
2510, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 435 (“While the Supreme Court reinforced in 
Hobby Lobby that we should defer to the reasonableness of the appellees’ religious 
beliefs, this does not bar our objective evaluation of the nature of the claimed burden 
and the substantiality of that burden on the appellees’ religious exercise.”); Univ. 
Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 612 (“Although Notre Dame is the final arbiter of its reli-
gious beliefs, it is for the courts to determine whether the law actually forces Notre 
Dame to act in a way that would violate those beliefs.”). 
 120. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 
1151, 1176 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 
136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated 
and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 436. 
 123. Id. at 435. 
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ly, which “did render the plaintiffs ‘complicit,’” or pay significant fines.124  
Absent an accommodation, this choice constituted an “actual burden.”125  But 
under the Accommodation, the religious nonprofits have a third option – giv-
ing notice through Form 700 or directly to HHS – that enables them to avoid 
the financial penalties in Hobby Lobby.126  That is, the Accommodation gives 
the religious nonprofits a way to avoid both providing contraceptive coverage 
directly and having to pay substantial penalties for not following the contra-
ception mandate, thereby removing the substantial burdens under the ACA. 
Moreover, contrary to the religious nonprofits’ contention, the Accom-
modation’s notice process does not “trigger” or “facilitate” the objectionable 
coverage.  Rather, the obligation of insurance issuers and TPAs to provide 
such coverage is mandated by the ACA: “Federal law, not the Form or notifi-
cation to HHS, provides for contraceptive coverage without cost sharing to 
plan participants and beneficiaries.”127  Thus, on the majority’s view, the 
Accommodation serves “to lift a burden from the [religious nonprofits’] 
shoulders”128 or, as the Third and Seventh Circuits put it, to “wash[ their] 
hands of any involvement in contraceptive coverage.”129  The Accommoda-
tion provides a way for the religious nonprofits to opt out of providing con-
traceptive coverage without having to pay any penalties or fines.  Using Form 
700 or giving notice directly to HHS “does not enable coverage”; “it simply 
notifies its health insurance issuer the organization will not be providing cov-
 
 124. Id. at 436; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2776–77 
(2014). 
 125. Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 436. 
 126. Id. at 437. 
 127. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 
1151, 1180 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 
136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated 
and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).  Three Justic-
es of the Supreme Court of the United States also have adopted this reasoning.  In 
Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014), the Court approved an 
alternative form of notice that the religious nonprofit could use instead of Form 700: 
“If the applicant informs the Secretary of Health and Human Services in writing that 
it is a nonprofit organization that holds itself out as religious and has religious objec-
tions to providing coverage for contraceptive services, the respondents are enjoined 
from enforcing against the applicant the challenged provisions of the [ACA].”  In 
dissent, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan adopted the reasoning of the circuit 
court majority: “[Wheaton College’s] claim ignores that the provision of contracep-
tive coverage is triggered not by its completion of the self-certification form, but by 
federal law.”  Id. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 128. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 614 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 
136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016). 
 129. Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 441 (quoting Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 
743 F.3d 547, 557 (7th Cir. 2014), vacated sub nom. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 
135 S. Ct. 1528 (2015)). 
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erage.”130  The insurance issuers and TPAs then must provide no-cost cover-
age for the contested services and cannot charge the religious nonprofits ex-
tra.  As a result, these courts conclude that submitting the self-certification 
Form or notice to HHS “does not make the appellees ‘complicit in the provi-
sion of contraceptive coverage.’  If anything, because the appellees specifical-
ly state on the self-certification form that they object on religious grounds to 
providing such coverage, it is a declaration that they will not be complicit in 
providing coverage.”131  Because signing the form is a de minimis act that 
does not cause, trigger, or facilitate contraceptive coverage, the religious 
nonprofits cannot establish that the Accommodation substantially burdens 
their exercise of religion. 
Consequently, several of the circuit courts contend that the religious 
nonprofits’ “real objection” is to the government’s provision of contracep-
tives under the ACA generally.132  The Accommodation enables the govern-
ment to ensure that the religious nonprofits’ employees receive coverage, 
which contravenes the religious nonprofits’ sincerely held religious beliefs.133  
The religious nonprofits object to the government’s finding a substitute to 
provide the objectionable contraceptive coverage.134  But this is just an objec-
tion to how the government conducts its internal operations when carrying 
out the HHS Mandate.  RFRA, though, does not permit the religious nonprof-
its to challenge the government’s internal operations or reliance on third par-
ties to carry out its policies: “RFRA does not grant [the religious nonprofits] a 
religious veto against plan providers’ compliance with those regulations, nor 
the right to enlist the government to effectuate such a religious veto against 
legally required conduct of third parties.”135 
The circuit courts invoke two of the Supreme Court’s pre-RFRA cases, 
Bowen v. Roy136 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,137 
to illustrate why this objection fails under RFRA.  In Roy, the plaintiff object-
ed to the government’s use of his daughter’s Social Security number because, 
pursuant to his Native American religious beliefs, any use of her unique iden-
 
 130. Little Sisters of the Poor, 794 F.3d at 1181.  See also 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.131(c)(1)(i) (2016) (“When a self-certification is provided directly to an issuer, 
the issuer has sole responsibility for providing such coverage in accordance with § 
147.130.”). 
 131. Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 438–39. 
 132. Id. at 439. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 251 
(D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. 
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Priests for Life v. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
 136. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
 137. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
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tifier would harm her spirit.138  The father sought an accommodation that, 
among other things, would preclude the government’s using her number in its 
internal operations.139  The Court denied his request, stating that “Roy may 
no more prevail on his religious objection to the Government’s use of a So-
cial Security number for his daughter than he could on a sincere religious 
objection to the size or color of the Government’s filing cabinets.”140  While 
“the Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms 
of governmental compulsion,” religious adherents cannot invoke free exercise 
“to dictate the conduct of the Government’s internal procedures.”141  Similar-
ly, in Lyng, Native American religious practitioners challenged the Forest 
Service’s plan to allow timber harvesting and road construction in an area of 
a national forest that three American Indian tribes traditionally used for reli-
gious purposes.142  Even though the Court had “no reason to doubt[] that the 
logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating 
effects on traditional Indian religious practices,” the Court rejected the free 
exercise challenge because the government neither coerced the individuals 
“into violating their religious beliefs” nor “penalize[d] religious activity by 
denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges en-
joyed by other citizens.”143  The Free Exercise Clause did not require the 
government “to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise 
lawful actions” just because a government program had the incidental effect 
of “mak[ing] it more difficult to practice certain religions but which ha[d] no 
tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious be-
liefs.”144 
To illustrate this point, several circuits have compared the religious 
nonprofits’ claim to that of a conscientious objector who objects on religious 
grounds to serving in the military and to the draft generally.145  Federal law  
 138. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 696. 
 139. Id. at 699. 
 140. Id. at 700. 
 141. Id. at 699–700. 
 142. 485 U.S. at 439. 
 143. Id. at 440, 449–50. 
 144. Id. at 440, 465.  See also Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (“The government’s extraction, analysis, and storage of Kaemmerling’s 
DNA information does not call for Kaemmerling to modify his religious behavior in 
any way – it involves no action or forbearance on his part, nor does it otherwise inter-
fere with any religious act in which he engages.”). 
 145. See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 
F.3d 1151, 1184 n.33 (10th Cir. 2015) (discussing the conscientious objector analogy 
and concluding that “the comparison is apt”), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene 
Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 
(2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per 
curiam); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(Hamilton, J., concurring), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016).  See also Geneva Coll. v. 
Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 439 n.14 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(making a similar point using an example of an employee who requests time off to 
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allows an exemption from military service for any person “who, by reason of 
religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in 
war in any form.”146  The circuit courts present a situation where a conscien-
tious objector applies for and receives an exemption.  In his Notre Dame con-
currence, Judge Hamilton posits that the conscientious objector also objects 
to the fact that, because he “will not be drafted, someone else will be drafted 
in his place.”147  The conscientious objector asserts that if his substitute will 
engage in the same wrongdoing that the conscientious objector would have 
been required to engage in (and which violated his sincere religious beliefs), 
then the conscientious objector remains morally responsible for that wrong-
doing.148  Drafting a substitute, therefore, substantially burdens the conscien-
tious objector’s sincere religious beliefs.149  Thus, invoking RFRA, the con-
scientious objector asserts that he must be given an accommodation without a 
substitute. 
According to Judge Hamilton, although the conscientious objector’s 
claim is a “fantastic suggestion,” the religious nonprofits make the same ar-
gument.150  And the religious nonprofits’ argument fails for the same reasons: 
(1) a “party claiming the exemption is not entitled to raise a religious objec-
tion to the arrangements the government makes for a substitute,” and (2) un-
der such a regime, “fair governance where the law imposes burdens on indi-
viduals would become nearly impossible.”151  Under Smith, the government 
may take actions that contravene citizens’ sincere religious beliefs without 
substantially burdening their exercise of religion under RFRA: 
Religious objectors do not suffer substantial burdens under RFRA 
where the only harm to them is that they sincerely feel aggrieved by 
their inability to prevent what other people would do to fulfill regula-
tory objectives after they opt out.  They have no RFRA right to be free 
from the unease, or even anguish, of knowing that third parties are le-
gally privileged or obligated to act in ways their religion abhors.152 
 
accommodate his exercise of religion but then objects to the government’s arranging 
for a substitute), cert. granted in part sub nom. Zubik II, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), and 
cert. granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and vacated 
and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557; Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 
S. Ct. 2806, 2812 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (invoking the Seventh Circuit’s 
conscientious objector example “to explain why Wheaton’s complicity theory cannot 
be legally sound”). 
 146. 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j) (2012). 
 147. Univ. Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 623 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. at 624. 
 149. Id. at 623. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 623–24. 
 152. Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 246 
(D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. 
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Consequently, because the Accommodation’s self-certification process 
does not substantially burden the exercise of religion by the religious non-
profits, the burden never shifts to the government, and the circuit court major-
ity does not even have to consider whether the government has a compelling 
interest and whether the Accommodation is the least restrictive means of ad-
vancing that interest. 
2.  The Eighth Circuit’s Defense of RFRA Protection for Religious 
Nonprofits 
The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit court to rule in favor of the reli-
gious nonprofits on the merits.  In Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. United States 
Department of Health & Human Services,153 two nonprofits, CNS Interna-
tional Ministries, Inc. (“CNS”) and Heartland Christian College (“HCC”),154 
objected to the Accommodation, claiming that “the government is coercing 
them to violate their religious beliefs by threatening to impose severe mone-
tary penalties unless they either directly provide coverage for objectionable 
contraceptives . . . or indirectly provide, trigger, and facilitate that objectiona-
ble coverage through the Form 700/HHS Notice accommodation process.”155  
Consistent with its winning argument in other circuits, the government main-
tained that the Accommodation did not burden CNS’s or HCC’s exercise of 
religion because the notice requirement did not “trigger” or “facilitate” con-
traceptive coverage because the ACA – and not the notice under the Accom-
modation – imposed a separate legal obligation on their TPAs to provide such 
coverage.156  In the alternative, even if CNS and HCC could establish a sub-
stantial burden, the government argued that it employed the least restrictive 
means of providing no-cost coverage for contraceptives.157 
As in the other religious nonprofit cases, in Sharpe Holdings, the gov-
ernment did not contest the sincerity of the claimants’ religious beliefs.  Un-
like the other circuit court cases, however, the Eighth Circuit found that the 
Accommodation substantially burdened the sincerely held beliefs of the reli-
gious nonprofits.158  CNS and HHS alleged that their religious beliefs pre-
 
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Priests for Life v. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
 153. 801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs. v. CNS Int’l Ministries, No. 15-775, 2016 WL 2842448 (U.S. May 16, 2016). 
 154. Given that HCC has fewer than fifty employees, it is not required to offer 
healthcare coverage.  See id. at 933; 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4980H(a), (c) (West 2015).  But 
HCC, consistent with CNS, offers such coverage as part of its “religious mission to 
promote the well-being and health of [its] employees.”  Sharpe Holdings, 801 F.3d at 
933. 
 155. Sharpe Holdings, 801 F.3d at 936. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 941. 
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cluded them from directly or indirectly providing coverage for certain contra-
ceptives, namely those that (in their view) operated as abortifacients by pre-
venting a fertilized egg from attaching in the womb.159  Given that “RFRA 
was designed to provide very broad protection for religious liberty,” protec-
tion that goes “far beyond what [the Supreme] Court has held is constitution-
ally required,”160 the panel deferred to CNS’s and HCC’s characterization of 
the effect of the Accommodation on their religious beliefs: “[A] religious 
objector is entitled to ‘dr[a]w a line’ regarding the conduct that his religion 
deems permissible, and once that line is drawn, ‘it is not for [a court] to say 
that the line . . .  was . . . unreasonable.’”161  According to the Eighth Circuit, 
all a court can do under Hobby Lobby “‘is to determine’ whether the line 
drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”162  In Sharpe Holdings, the religious 
nonprofits “sincerely believe[d] that the actions ‘demanded by the . . . regula-
tions [were] connected to’ illicit conduct ‘in a way that is sufficient to make it 
immoral for them to’ take those actions.”163  Under the Supreme Court prece-
dents, the court, therefore, could neither second-guess the sincerity of the 
religious nonprofits’ beliefs nor assess whether those beliefs were correct.164 
Yet for the Eighth Circuit panel, the government’s argument required 
the court to do just that – to assess the reasonableness or correctness of 
CNS’s and HCC’s religious beliefs.  But the legal question (whether the ACA 
imposed a legal obligation to provide contraceptive coverage on insurance 
issuers when a religious nonprofit gave notice under the Accommodation) did 
not resolve the moral question (whether signing and submitting Form 700 or 
giving detailed notice to HHS made a religious claimant complicit in immoral 
conduct).165  The religious nonprofits answered the latter question in the af-
firmative, and under Thomas, the court could not adjudge their response, giv-
 
 159. Id. at 935–36. 
 160. Id. at 938. 
 161. Id. at 939 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707, 715 (1981)). 
 162. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014) (quoting 
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716). 
 163. Sharpe Holdings, 801 F.3d at 941 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2778). 
 164. See, e.g., Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 808 F.3d 
1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(“Judicially second-guessing the correctness or reasonableness (as opposed to the 
sincerity) of plaintiffs’ religious beliefs is exactly what the Supreme Court in Hobby 
Lobby told us not to do.”). 
 165. See Sharpe Holdings, 801 F.3d at 942 (“The question here is not whether 
CNS and HCC have correctly interpreted the law, but whether they have a sincere 
religious belief that their participation in the accommodation process makes them 
morally and spiritually complicit in providing abortifacient coverage.  Their affirma-
tive answer to that question is not for us to dispute.”). 
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en that religious beliefs need not be “acceptable, logical, consistent, or com-
prehensible to others” to warrant RFRA protection.166 
Moreover, the panel rejected the government’s claim that the Accom-
modation could not substantially burden the religious nonprofits’ exercise of 
religion because they had already declared their objection to providing con-
traceptive coverage by excluding such coverage from their original poli-
cies.167  The Eighth Circuit emphasized that the government’s argument ig-
nored the fact that the Accommodation brought about the specific coverage 
that CNS and HCC expressly sought to prevent – having a group health plan 
that provided for contraceptive coverage that violated their sincere religious 
beliefs.168  The notice, therefore, had a direct effect on the obligations of 
TPAs, thereby undermining the government’s claim that self-certification 
under the Accommodation could not burden the claimants’ exercise of reli-
gion: “If TPAs had a wholly independent obligation to provide contraceptive 
coverage to religious objectors’ employees and plan beneficiaries, there 
would be no need to insist on CNS and HCC’s compliance with the accom-
modation process.”169  In addition, the Eighth Circuit had no problem con-
cluding that the ACA constituted a substantial burden because CNS and HCC 
faced the same “significant monetary penalties” if they failed to either abide 
by the contraception mandate or submit the written notice specified in the 
Accommodation:170 “When the government imposes a direct monetary penal-
ty to coerce conduct that violates religious belief, [t]here has never been a 
question that the government imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of 
religion.”171 
Having found that the Accommodation substantially burdened the reli-
gious nonprofits’ exercise of religion,172 the burden shifted to the government 
to show that it had a compelling interest and that the Accommodation was the 
least restrictive means of achieving that interest.  The Eighth Circuit followed 
the majority in Hobby Lobby and “assume[d] that the interest in guaranteeing 
cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling 
within the meaning of RFRA.”173  Turning to the “exceptionally demand-
ing”174 least-restrictive-means analysis, the court noted that the government 
must show that “‘no alternative forms of regulation’ would accomplish those 
interests without infringing on a claimant’s religious-exercise rights.”175   
 166. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714. 
 167. Sharpe Holdings, 801 F.3d at 942. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 937. 
 171. Id. at 938 (alteration in original). 
 172. See id. (“In light of CNS and HCC’s sincerely held religious beliefs, we 
conclude that compelling their participation in the accommodation process by threat 
of severe monetary penalty is a substantial burden on their exercise of religion.”). 
 173. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Sharpe Holdings, 801 F.3d at 943 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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While recognizing that Hobby Lobby determined that the Accommodation 
was less restrictive than requiring the religious for-profits to provide coverage 
directly, the Eighth Circuit panel explained that the Court’s holding was lim-
ited to the facts of the for-profit cases, i.e., that the Hobby Lobby Court “was 
specifically ‘not decid[ing] . . . whether an approach of this type complies 
with RFRA for purposes of all religious claims.’”176  Hobby Lobby and Con-
estoga Wood Specialties did not object to the Accommodation on free exer-
cise grounds.177  As a result, the Accommodation served to accommodate 
these particular claimants.  Furthermore, any uncertainty on this point was 
removed shortly after Hobby Lobby when the Supreme Court issued its order 
in Wheaton College,178 permitting the religious school to avoid the contracep-
tion mandate by notifying HHS directly that it objected to the Accommoda-
tion on religious grounds without having to give detailed written notice 
through Form 700 or to HHS.179 
Although not a final decision on the merits, the Eighth Circuit conclud-
ed that the Court’s willingness to enjoin enforcement of the contraception 
mandate (if religious nonprofits gave notice of their objection to HHS) sig-
naled a less restrictive way by which the government could pursue its inter-
ests.180  To the extent that the government knew who the religious nonprofits’ 
TPAs were, there would be no cost to the government to implement the con-
traception mandate through TPAs.181  And even if TPAs were unknown, the 
government failed to establish at that stage in the case that identifying TPAs 
would impose an administrative hurdle so high that the contraception man-
date would become “unworkable.”182  In addition, there was no indication 
 
 176. Id. (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782) (alteration in original).  See 
also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2806 n.40 (“The less restrictive approach we describe 
accommodates the religious beliefs asserted in these cases, and that is the only ques-
tion we are permitted to address.”). 
 177. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2806 n.27. 
 178. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014).  See also Little 
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1220 (10th 
Cir. 2015) (enjoining enforcement of the contraception mandate if the Little Sisters of 
the Poor provide written notice to HHS stating that the claimants “are non-profit or-
ganizations that hold themselves out as religious and have religious objections to 
providing coverage for contraceptive services”), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene 
Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 
(2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per 
curiam). 
 179. Sharpe Holdings, 801 F.3d at 944. 
 180. Id. at 944.  See also Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
808 F.3d 1, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc) (“[R]egardless of whether we as a lower court are formally bound by the 
Supreme Court stay orders in Wheaton College and Little Sisters of the Poor, the 
notice identified by the Supreme Court in those two cases is undoubtedly a less re-
strictive way for the Government to further its interest than [the Accommodation].”). 
 181. Sharpe Holdings, 801 F.3d at 944. 
 182. Id. 
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that Wheaton College notice would affect the ability of CNS’s and HCC’s 
employees to receive contraceptive coverage, especially given that the gov-
ernment could “rely[] on th[e] notice, to the extent it considers it necessary, to 
facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage under the [ACA].”183  
Thus, the government failed to meet its burden, and the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the injunction against enforcement of the contraception mandate 
against CNS and HCC. 
C.  Zubik v. Burwell: Remand Without Resolution of the Merits 
The Court heard oral argument in Zubik on March 23, 2016.  In a 
somewhat unusual move, on March 29, 2016, the Court issued an order di-
recting the parties “to file supplemental briefs that address whether and how 
contraceptive coverage may be obtained by petitioners’ employees through 
petitioners’ insurance companies, but in a way that does not require any in-
volvement of petitioners beyond their own decision to provide health insur-
ance without contraceptive coverage to their employees.”184  That is, the 
Court asked the parties to explain whether the notice provision under the Ac-
commodation, which was the basis for the religious nonprofits’ lawsuits, was 
necessary to ensure contraceptive coverage to the petitioners’ employees.  In 
particular, the Order required the parties to consider a specific proposal: a 
situation where the religious nonprofits inform their insurance companies that 
they do not want to provide any contraceptive coverage to which they object 
on religious grounds, and the insurance companies (without any further action 
by the religious nonprofits) separately notify the employees of the religious 
nonprofits that the insurance company (and not the religious nonprofits or 
their health plan) will provide cost-free contraceptive coverage.185 
The parties filed their supplemental briefs in April 2016, addressing the 
specific issue set forth in the Court’s March 29, 2015, Order.  In its brief, the 
government ultimately acknowledged that the Court’s proposal was possible 
for religious nonprofits with insured plans: “[T]he accommodation for em-
ployers with insured plans could be modified to operate in the manner posited 
in the Court’s order while still ensuring that the affected women receive con-
traceptive coverage seamlessly.”186  The government’s admission suggested 
 
 183. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807.  The religious nonprofits also argued that 
the government had other less restrictive ways of ensuring cost-free contraceptive 
coverage, including, among other things, by having the government (1) cover the cost 
(by means of “subsidies, reimbursements, tax credits, or tax deductions to employ-
ees”), (2) “pay for the distribution of such services at community health centers, pub-
lic clinics, and hospitals with income-based support,” and (3) “make contraceptives 
available to employees through its own healthcare exchanges.”  Sharpe Holdings, 801 
F.3d at 945. 
 184. Zubik v. Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 
15-191, 2016 WL 1203818, at *2 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2016). 
 185. See id. 
 186. Supplemental Brief for the Respondents, supra note 46, at 14–15. 
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that the Accommodation was not the least restrictive way to provide no-cost 
contraceptive coverage to women working for religious nonprofits who ob-
jected to the Accommodation on religious grounds.  But the admission did 
not resolve the threshold question – whether the Accommodation constitutes 
a substantial burden on the free exercise of religious nonprofits.  Moreover, 
as all of the parties acknowledged, the Court’s proposal did not address the 
RFRA claims of self-insured plans.187  As a result, in the wake of the supple-
mental briefs, it appeared that the Court would have to decide whether the 
Accommodation substantially burdened the free exercise of religious non-
profits, such that the burden should shift to the government to prove that the 
Accommodation was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest. 
Instead, the Court issued a per curiam opinion that vacated and remand-
ed the consolidated cases to the circuit courts but “expresse[d] no view on the 
merits of the cases.”188  Given “the gravity of the dispute” and that “[b]oth 
petitioners and the Government now confirm that [providing contraceptive 
coverage to petitioners’ employees through petitioners’ insurance companies 
but without notice from petitioners] is feasible,”189 the Court concluded that 
the cases should be remanded to afford the parties “an opportunity to arrive at 
an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise 
while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health 
plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive cover-
age.’”190  Accordingly, the Court stated it was “not decid[ing] whether peti-
tioners’ religious exercise has been substantially burdened, whether the Gov-
ernment has a compelling interest, or whether the current regulations are the 
least restrictive means of serving that interest.”191  Consequently, on remand, 
the lower courts must reconsider the merits and, for the reasons discussed 
below, should find that the Accommodation substantially burdens the free 
exercise of religious nonprofits that object on religious grounds to providing 
the ACA’s contraception coverage. 
 
 187. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“[T]he order correctly anticipates that the alternative it 
posits would not work for the many employers with self-insured plans, which use 
third-party administrators (TPAs) rather than insurers . . . .”); Supplemental Brief for 
Petitioners at 16–17, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-
1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191), 2016 WL 1445914, at *16–17 (“This 
Court’s order focused on ‘[p]etitioners with insured plans.’  That focus presumably 
recognizes that the dynamic is quite different for employers that self-insure or utilize 
self-insured church plans.”) (alteration in original). 
 188. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1560. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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III.  THE LOWER COURTS FUNDAMENTALLY MISCONSTRUED 
RFRA’S SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN ANALYSIS AND, IN THE PROCESS, 
USURPED THE RIGHT OF RELIGIOUS ADHERENTS TO DETERMINE 
THEIR OWN VIEWS REGARDING MORAL COMPLICITY 
RFRA was passed “to provide very broad protection for religious liber-
ty.”192  Congress defined “religious exercise” expansively to include “any 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief.”193  Congress also specified that this concept “shall be con-
strued in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum 
extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”194  Fol-
lowing Congress’s mandate, the Supreme Court has interpreted the “exercise 
of religion” to “involve[] ‘not only belief and profession but the performance 
of (or abstention from) physical acts’ that are ‘engaged in for religious rea-
sons.’”195 
Under RFRA, the plaintiff has the burden of “showing that the relevant 
exercise of religion is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief” and that 
the government’s “policy substantially burden[s] that exercise of religion.”196  
Consistent with Congress’s directives, courts generally do not dispute the 
sincerity of a petitioner’s religious belief.197  And none of the lower courts 
have questioned the sincerity of the petitioners’ religious beliefs in the reli-
gious nonprofit cases.198  
 192. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014). 
 193. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5(7)(A) (2012). 
 194. § 2000cc-3(g). 
 195. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770 (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. 
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 870 (1990)), superseded by statute, §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4, as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
 196. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862. 
 197. Although courts frequently defer to a religious adherent’s claim that a belief 
is sincerely held, that deference is not absolute.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805.  As 
the Court stated in Hobby Lobby, “[A] pretextual assertion of a religious belief in 
order to obtain an exemption for financial reasons would fail.”  Id. at 2806 n.28.  
Similarly, the Court acknowledged that “by the time of RLUIPA’s enactment, the 
propensity of some prisoners to assert claims of dubious sincerity was well docu-
mented.”  Id. at 2774. 
 198. See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 
F.3d 1151, 1176 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Thus, we ‘accept[] as true the factual allegations 
that [Plaintiffs’] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature – but not the legal con-
clusion, cast as a factual allegation that [their] religious exercise is substantially bur-
dened.’” (quoting Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008))), cert. 
granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and cert. 
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik 
III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam); Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 
F.3d 207, 217 (2d Cir. 2015) (“To be sure, the government concedes, and we do not 
doubt, the sincerity of Plaintiffs’ belief that providing, paying for, or facilitating ac-
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The problem is that the lower courts have disregarded Congress’s and 
the Court’s instruction that RFRA applies broadly to “any exercise of reli-
gion.”199  After carefully reviewing the religious nonprofits’ claims, the lower 
courts have concluded that the Accommodation does not substantially burden 
the plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious belief that providing notice under the 
Accommodation makes them complicit in a grave moral wrong.200  As dis-
cussed above, these courts have offered two related justifications for this con-
clusion.  First, they contend that federal law (i.e., the ACA), not the notice 
under the Accommodation, creates the legal obligation of insurance issuers 
and TPAs to provide contraceptive coverage.  Consequently, the petitioners 
are not responsible for – and, therefore, their religious beliefs are not impli-
cated by – their employees receiving contraception and sterilization services 
through the religious nonprofits’ insurance providers or TPAs.201  Second, the 
Accommodation is just that, an accommodation intended to remove the sub-
stantial burden of complying with the ACA.  According to the lower courts, 
giving notice under the Accommodation serves as “a declaration that [the 
religious nonprofits] will not be complicit in providing coverage” and conse-
quently “does not necessitate any action that interferes with the appellees’ 
religious activities.”202 
By focusing exclusively on the legal cause of the provision of contra-
ceptive and sterilization services, the lower courts make the same mistake that 
HHS made in Hobby Lobby: they obfuscate the central question under 
RFRA’s substantial burden analysis (“whether the [Accommodation] imposes 
a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to conduct business 
in accordance with their religious beliefs”) and then proceed to answer a dif-
 
cess to contraceptive services is contrary to their faith.  Nor do we doubt that, in 
Plaintiffs’ religious judgment, participation in the accommodation violates this be-
lief.”), vacated, No. 15-1100, 2016 WL 816249 (U.S. May 23, 2016); Priests For Life 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Plain-
tiffs are correct that they – and not this Court – determine what religious observance 
their faith commands.”), cert. granted sub nom. Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Wash. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Priests for Life 
v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remand-
ed sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557. 
 199. Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 808 F.3d 1, 19 
(D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 200. See cases cited supra note 16. 
 201. See, e.g., Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2812 (2014) (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting) (“I do not doubt that Wheaton genuinely believes that signing 
the self-certification form is contrary to its religious beliefs.  But thinking one’s reli-
gious beliefs are substantially burdened – no matter how sincere or genuine that belief 
may be – does not make it so.”). 
 202. Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 
439 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part sub nom. Zubik II, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), 
and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and va-
cated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557. 
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ferent question (“whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is rea-
sonable”).203 
Under Hobby Lobby, though, the answer to the first (and only proper) 
question is unequivocally “yes.”  Under the ACA, religious nonprofits must 
either (1) provide coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptives and sterili-
zation procedures (which would violate their sincerely held religious beliefs), 
(2) give notice under the Accommodation (which also would violate their 
sincere religious beliefs), or (3) pay the significant penalties imposed for 
noncompliance.  Under Hobby Lobby and Holt, putting petitioners to this 
choice substantially burdens their religious exercise. 
A.  Religious Beliefs Are Substantially Burdened Under RFRA If the 
Government Forces an Adherent to Choose Between Complying with a 
Law That Violates His Religious Beliefs and Facing Serious Penalties 
If He Follows His Faith 
Given the broad protection afforded the exercise of religion under 
RFRA, the substantiality of a burden is determined by the level of force the 
government applies to get a religious believer to contravene his religious be-
liefs, not a court’s independent determination that a law’s requirements are or 
are not actually consistent with his professed religious beliefs.  As Hobby 
Lobby and Holt instruct, a substantial burden arises when the government 
puts a religious nonprofit to the choice of either “‘engag[ing] in conduct that 
seriously violates [its] religious beliefs’ . . . [or] fac[ing] serious disciplinary 
action” or penalties for violating the government’s directive.204  Rather than 
assessing the compatibility of the asserted beliefs and the law at issue, courts 
are limited to deciding whether the government places substantial pressure on 
the religious objector to violate those beliefs.  Under RFRA, the religious 
adherent gets to define the nature of his own sincerely held beliefs, as well as 
what constitutes a violation of those beliefs.  Hence, as the Court stated in 
Hobby Lobby, the proper question under RFRA is “whether the HHS mandate 
 
 203. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
 204. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2775); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) 
(finding a substantial burden when the government places “substantial pressure on an 
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs”) (emphasis added); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (finding a “clear” burden where the state 
supreme court’s “ruling forces [a religious adherent] to choose between following the 
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one 
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand”) (“Govern-
mental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exer-
cise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.”); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (concluding that Wisconsin’s compul-
sory-attendance law imposed a severe burden on the Amish plaintiffs because it “af-
firmatively compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undenia-
bly at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs”). 
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imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to conduct 
business in accordance with their religious beliefs.”205  Courts can consider 
the degree of force the government used to ensure compliance (i.e., whether 
the government imposed a substantial burden), but they cannot decide wheth-
er the required action actually interferes with the religious adherent’s asserted 
religious beliefs.206 
Applying this standard in Holt, the Court found that the plaintiff “easily 
satisfied” his burden.  Because the Arkansas Department of Corrections re-
quired the prisoner to either shave his beard or follow his religious beliefs and 
“face serious disciplinary action,” the Court unanimously concluded that the 
government policy “substantially burden[ed] his religious exercise.”207  Simi-
larly, in Hobby Lobby, the Court held that the contraceptive mandate imposed 
a substantial burden on the closely held corporations “[b]ecause the contra-
ceptive mandate forces them to pay an enormous sum of money . . . if they 
insist on providing insurance coverage in accordance with their religious be-
liefs.”208  Given that no one questioned the sincerity of the closely held cor-
porations’ beliefs, and that the penalties under the ACA for not providing 
such coverage “are surely substantial,” the Court had “little trouble conclud-
ing” that “the HHS contraceptive mandate ‘substantially burden[ed]’ the ex-
ercise of religion.”209 
The circuit court majority ignores Hobby Lobby’s and Holt’s emphasis 
on the nature of the choice and, in the process, misconstrues the role of the 
courts in assessing whether a burden is substantial.  The lower courts start 
with an accurate characterization of the judicial role under RFRA: “RFRA’s 
statutory text and religious liberty case law demonstrate that courts – not 
plaintiffs – must determine if a law or policy substantially burdens religious 
exercise.”210  But they then impermissibly substitute the legal question (what 
constitutes a substantial burden under Hobby Lobby and Holt) with a moral  
 205. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778; see also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715 (revers-
ing the state supreme court, which denied benefits based on concern over the line the 
employee drew between work that he found to be consistent with his religious beliefs 
and work that he found to be morally objectionable, because “it [was] not for [the 
Court] to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one”). 
 206. Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1146 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 207. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862. 
 208. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 209. Id. at 2759, 2775–76 (“If these consequences do not amount to a substantial 
burden, it is hard to see what would.”). 
 210. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 
1151, 1176 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 
136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated 
and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam); Univ. of 
Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Although Notre Dame is 
the final arbiter of its religious beliefs, it is for the courts to determine whether the 
law actually forces Notre Dame to act in a way that would violate those beliefs.”), 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016). 
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question (whether the Accommodation actually makes religious nonprofits 
complicit in sin or wrongdoing): “Without testing the appellees’ religious 
beliefs, we must nonetheless objectively assess whether the appellees’ com-
pliance with the self-certification procedure does, in fact, trigger, facilitate, or 
make them complicit in the provision of contraceptive coverage.”211  While 
courts are the last arbiters of legal questions,212 the Supreme Court has ex-
plained that courts should not – and cannot – resolve moral and religious 
questions.213  As a result, contrary to the majority of lower courts in the reli-
gious nonprofit cases, judges cannot assess the weight or degree of burden on 
a religious adherent’s exercise of religion; rather, all they can do is decide 
whether the government is improperly pressuring the religious nonprofits to 
conduct their business in a way that violates the nonprofits’ sincerely held 
religious beliefs. 
For example, in Geneva College, the Third Circuit invoked Lyng to sup-
port its claim that courts must make an “objective evaluation of the nature of 
the claimed burden and the substantiality of that burden on the [religious 
nonprofits’] religious exercise.”214  Specifically, the Third Circuit concluded 
that Lyng assessed the weight of the burden imposed on the religious adher-
ents.215  Because the plaintiffs had failed to show that “the burden on the re-
spondents’ belief was ‘heavy enough to violate the Free Exercise Clause,’” 
the government did not have to “demonstrate a compelling need.”216 
But Lyng expressly denied that courts can evaluate the weight or degree 
of burden imposed on a religious objector: “This Court cannot determine the 
truth of the underlying beliefs that led to the religious objections here or in 
Roy . . . and accordingly cannot weigh the adverse effects on the appellees in 
Roy and compare them with the adverse effects on the Indian respondents.”217   
 211. Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 
435 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part sub nom. Zubik II, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), 
and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and va-
cated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557. 
 212. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 213. See, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
887 (1990) (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts 
must not presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim.”), superseded 
by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 
(2012), as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
 214. 778 F.3d at 436. 
 215. Id.  See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 216. Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 436 (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447). 
 217. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449–50.  The lower courts’ attempts to determine the level 
of burden – i.e., whether the Accommodation actually or really burdens the religious 
nonprofits’ exercise of religion – also leads them to contravene the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that courts cannot judge whether religious beliefs are “acceptable, logical, 
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protec-
tion.”  Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).  But 
the Tenth Circuit does just that: “The Little Sisters and Reaching Souls plaintiffs have 
39
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Contrary to the Third Circuit’s suggestion (discussed fully below), Lyng de-
termined that there was no substantial burden because there was “no tendency 
to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs.”218  The 
religious adherents in Lyng were not put to the choice that Hobby Lobby and 
Holt characterize as a substantial burden – having to face “serious” conse-
quences for adhering to their religious beliefs or having to take a government-
mandated action that violates those beliefs.219 
That the substantial burden prong under RFRA relates to the degree of 
pressure the government brings to bear on a religious adherent to violate her 
sincerely held religious beliefs (and not a court’s allegedly objective determi-
nation whether the government-required action actually violates those beliefs) 
is not surprising.  Finding an infringement on the exercise of religion where 
the government forces one to follow its directives is the analogue of the coer-
cion test in the Establishment Clause context.  As the Court explained in 
Yoder, “[T]he Religion Clauses had specifically and firmly fixed the right to 
free exercise of religious beliefs, and buttressing this fundamental right was 
an equally firm, even if less explicit, prohibition against the establishment of 
any religion by government.”220  If the government could neither create a 
state-established church nor force individuals to either adopt particular reli-
gious views or financially support a specific sect, then citizens would have 
greater freedom to exercise their own religion.221  Although the Justices have 
disagreed as to exactly what constitutes impermissible force, they have 
agreed that the government cannot coerce individuals to engage in religious 
activities: “[A]t a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government 
 
not convincingly explained how the notice to HHS promulgated by the Departments 
would substantially burden their religious exercise but the notice crafted by the Su-
preme Court does not.”  Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Bur-
well, 794 F.3d 1151, 1178 n.25 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene 
Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 
(2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per 
curiam). 
 218. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450. 
 219. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). 
 220. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).  See also Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 591–92 (1992) (“The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of 
conscience and worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First 
Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state 
intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech provisions.  
The explanation lies in the lesson of history that was and is the inspiration for the 
Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands of government what might begin as 
a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and co-
erce.  A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and con-
science which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.”). 
 221. Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The coercion that was a 
hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy 
and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.”). 
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may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”222  
Post-Lee v. Weisman, in which the Court held that prayers at high school 
graduation ceremonies were unconstitutional,223 this coercion may take dif-
ferent forms.  Coercion may include “acts backed by threat of penalty”224 or 
“public pressure, as well as peer pressure,” in the school context.225  In either 
case, though, the violation of the Establishment Clause results from the gov-
ernment’s putting sufficient pressure – by force of law or psychological com-
pulsion – to make individuals participate in a religious exercise or involuntar-
ily support religion or a specific sect.226 
Under the coercion test, then, courts must determine whether the force 
used is substantial enough to constitute coercion to participate in a religious 
exercise.  The disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Lee cen-
tered on what constitutes sufficient force or coercion.227  Justice Scalia and 
the dissenters in Lee thought that psychological coercion was an improper 
basis for finding an Establishment Clause violation because such determina-
tions fell outside the courts’ competence.228  While courts are equipped to 
decide whether government-mandated actions are backed by a threat of penal-
ty (like the “serious consequences” concern under RFRA’s substantial burden 
prong),229 they are ill-equipped to determine whether an individual has been 
psychologically coerced to do something: “A few citations of ‘[r]esearch in 
psychology’ that have no particular bearing upon the precise issue here . . . 
cannot disguise the fact that the Court has gone beyond the realm where 
judges know what they are doing.”230  For its part, the Lee majority consid-
ered external factors, such as the age of the students,231 the importance of 
attending graduation,232 and the government’s control over the graduation 
ceremony233 in concluding that there was sufficient pressure on students to 
attend the ceremony to make out an Establishment Clause violation.234 
 
 222. Id. at 587 (majority opinion). 
 223. Id. at 599. 
 224. Id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 225. Id. at 593 (majority opinion). 
 226. See, e.g., L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 3–4, 8–9 (1986). 
 227. Lee, 505 U.S. at 640–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 228. Id. at 646. 
 229. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). 
 230. Lee, 505 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first alteration in original). 
 231. Id. at 595 (majority opinion) (“And to say a teenage student has a real choice 
not to attend her high school graduation is formalistic in the extreme.”). 
 232. Id. (“Graduation is a time for family and those closest to the student to cele-
brate success and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all to the end of 
impressing upon the young person the role that it is his or her right and duty to as-
sume in the community and all of its diverse parts.”). 
 233. Id. at 597 (“At a high school graduation, teachers and principals must and do 
retain a high degree of control over the precise contents of the program, the speeches, 
41
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The same type of analysis applies in the free exercise context.  Under 
Hobby Lobby and Holt, when deciding whether a religious adherent’s sincere 
beliefs have been substantially burdened, courts must consider only whether 
the government has imposed significant pressure or force on the individual to 
contravene her religious beliefs, not whether the court believes that her be-
liefs have actually been violated.  Courts must evaluate the external pressure 
brought to bear on the religious adherents and decide whether that pressure 
effectively prevents them from operating their organizations consistently with 
their religious beliefs. 
As a result, in the wake of Hobby Lobby and Holt, the religious nonprof-
it cases also present “little trouble.”235  There is no question that, if the reli-
gious nonprofits do not give notice under the Accommodation or do not pro-
vide contraceptive coverage directly, they will be subject to the same “sub-
stantial” penalties that Hobby Lobby and Conestoga faced.  When religious 
adherents are put to such a choice, Hobby Lobby instructs that the courts’ 
“‘narrow function . . . is to determine’ whether the line drawn reflects ‘an 
honest conviction.’”236  Courts are restricted to considering only whether a 
religious nonprofit’s asserted belief is sincere or reflects an “honest convic-
tion,” because courts are precluded from evaluating the veracity, consistency, 
or reasonableness of religious beliefs: “[R]eligious beliefs need not be ac-
ceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit 
First Amendment protection.”237  But given that the lower courts do not ques-
tion the sincerity of the religious nonprofits’ belief (that providing the re-
quired notice would make them complicit in serious wrongdoing), “there is 
no dispute that it does” reflect an honest conviction.238  Thus, the Accommo-
dation constitutes a substantial burden on the religious beliefs of nonprofit 
organizations, such as the Little Sisters of the Poor and Priests for Life. 
The lower courts avoid this conclusion only by mischaracterizing the re-
ligious nonprofits’ objection to the Accommodation.  According to the lower 
courts, the religious nonprofits object to the provision of contraceptive ser-
vices generally (even if done by third parties) and not to the de minimis act of 
signing a form.239  Drawing on the conscientious objector example, these 
 
the timing, the movements, the dress, and the decorum of the students.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 234. Id. (“In this atmosphere the state-imposed character of an invocation and 
benediction by clergy selected by the school combine to make the prayer a state-
sanctioned religious exercise in which the student was left with no alternative but to 
submit.”). 
 235. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014). 
 236. Id. at 2779 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707, 716 (1981)). 
 237. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716. 
 238. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2757. 
 239. Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207, 222 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“Courts have not found a substantial burden where a plaintiff argues that her reli-
gious exercise is violated by the government’s internal operations or, by extension, its 
42
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courts contend that (1) the religious nonprofits object to having any substitute 
provide contraceptive coverage, and (2) “[t]he party claiming the exemption 
is not entitled to raise a religious objection to the arrangements the govern-
ment makes for a substitute.”240 
Although many religious believers disagree with the government’s re-
quiring employers to provide coverage for all FDA-approved contraception 
and sterilization procedures, that is not the basis for the religious nonprofits’ 
objection to the Accommodation.  Rather, they object to the government’s 
coercing religious organizations to provide specific information (either 
through Form 700 or directly to HHS) that they sincerely believe violates the 
tenets of their faith by authorizing the ongoing use of their healthcare infor-
mation and infrastructure, which, in turn, results in the provision of contra-
ceptive and sterilization services.241  That is, as in Hobby Lobby, “[T]he 
 
decision to burden third parties, even where the plaintiff plays a precipitating role.”), 
vacated, No. 15-1100, 2016 WL 816249 (U.S. May 23, 2016); Priests for Life v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“An asserted 
burden is . . . not an actionable substantial burden when it falls on a third party, not 
the religious adherent.”), cert. granted sub nom. Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Wash. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Priests for Life 
v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remand-
ed sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam); Little Sisters of the Poor 
Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1181 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Be-
cause federal law requires the health insurance issuer to provide coverage and the 
accommodation process removes an objecting organization from participating, plain-
tiffs with insured plans fail to show the accommodation burdens their religious exer-
cise.”), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), 
and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557; id. at 1192 (“Plaintiffs are not substantially burdened 
solely by the de minimis administrative tasks this involves.”). 
 240. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 623 (7th Cir. 2015) (Hamil-
ton, J., concurring), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016). 
 241. That signing the self-certification form is more than a simple de minimis 
administrative task without legal or moral effect is apparent from the government’s 
claim that the required information is “the minimum information necessary . . . to 
determine which entities are covered by the accommodation, to administer the ac-
commodation, and to implement” the government’s policy.  Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51092, 51095 (Aug. 
27, 2014) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); 
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 41318, 41323 (July 14, 2015) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 
2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).  Self-certification authorizes a third party to effectively co-
opt the petitioners’ plan and to use their healthcare information and infrastructure to 
provide coverage for services that violate their religious beliefs.  80 Fed. Reg. at 
41318, 41323.  As Judge Kavanaugh aptly put the point in his Priests for Life dissent, 
“After all, if the form were meaningless, why would the Government require it?”  
Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 808 F.3d 1, 20 (Kavanaugh, 
J., dissenting). 
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plaintiffs do assert that [signing the notice] violates their religious beliefs, and 
[the courts] do[] not question their sincerity.”242 
Under RFRA, the key is that the religious nonprofits have “articulated a 
religious objection to the [Accommodation].”243  The Accommodation re-
quires the religious nonprofits to take a specific action (submitting Form 700 
to their insurance issuers or TPAs or providing detailed notice directly to 
HHS) that, in their view, makes them complicit in moral wrongdoing.244  This 
fact distinguishes the religious nonprofit cases from situations where the 
plaintiffs failed to articulate a religious objection to the required action.245  
Moreover, the religious nonprofits’ specific religious objection to the notice 
requirement also shows why the government’s and the circuit court majori-
ty’s reliance on Bowen v. Roy,246 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec-
tive Ass’n,247 and Kaemmerling v. Lappin248 to “confirm that [courts] can, 
indeed should, examine the nature and degree of the asserted burden to decide 
whether it amounts to a substantial burden under RFRA” is misplaced.249  
Echoing the lower courts, the government, in its brief in the religious non-
profit cases, states that “Roy and Lyng are among the pre-Smith decisions that 
 
 242. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 243. Id. 
 244. The more generic notice provision that the Court approved in Wheaton Col-
lege and Little Sisters of the Poor may provide a less restrictive means of giving no-
tice to the government.  Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014); 
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022, 
1022 (2014).  In Wheaton College, the Court noted that “[n]othing in this order pre-
cludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it neces-
sary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage under the Act.”  134 S. 
Ct. at 2807. 
  Two points are relevant here: First, the circuit court majority did not reach 
the least-restrictive-means inquiry because the religious nonprofits allegedly did not 
satisfy their initial burden under RFRA.  Id.  Second, this Article focuses only on the 
plaintiffs’ burden under RFRA, such that the least-restrictive-means analysis goes 
beyond the scope of this Article.  See infra Part III. 
 245. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (plurality opinion) (re-
jecting a claim that the use of general tax revenue to subsidize the secular activities of 
religious institutions violated the Free Exercise Clause because plaintiffs were “una-
ble to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their religious be-
liefs”); Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) 
(“[A]ppellants have not contended that the New York law in any way coerces them as 
individuals in the practice of their religion.”). 
 246. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 706–07 (1986). 
 247. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 
(1988). 
 248. Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 249. Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 
441 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part sub nom. Zubik II, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), 
and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and va-
cated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
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give content to RFRA’s substantial-burden standard.”250  And under this 
standard, the government contends that “just as Roy and Lyng instruct that a 
religious objector may not dictate the government’s internal activities, the 
religious objections of some individuals cannot control the government’s 
dealings with others.”251 
Contrary to the government’s claim, however, none of the Court’s pre-
Smith cases involve the situation where, as here, the government coerces in-
dividuals to take (or refrain from taking) a specific action that contradicts (or 
is required by) their sincerely held religious beliefs.  In Roy, the Court em-
phasized that there was no substantial burden because the government was 
not requiring the religious adherents to take an action that would violate their 
religious beliefs: “[I]n no sense does [the Social Security requirement] af-
firmatively compel appellees, by threat of sanctions, to refrain from religious-
ly motivated conduct or to engage in conduct that they find objectionable for 
religious reasons.”252  Likewise, in Lyng, the Court declined to apply strict 
scrutiny to a free exercise claim where the Forest Services’s building roads in 
a national forest had “no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary 
to their religious beliefs.”253  While the project might burden the Native 
Americans’ religious practice (like Oregon’s ban on peyote in Smith preclud-
ed the sacramental use of the drug), the government did not mandate that the 
religious adherents take any action that violated their religious beliefs.254  
And Kaemmerling does not alter the analysis.  In Kaemmerling¸ a federal 
prisoner sought to enjoin the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act, which 
directed prison officials to collect “a tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample” so 
that an analysis of the DNA identification information could be performed.255  
But the D.C. Circuit expressly held that the government’s extraction and use 
 
 250. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 14, at 43. 
 251. Id. at 44. 
 252. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986).  In Roy, the Court rejected the 
parents’ claim because, among other things, “Never to [its] knowledge ha[d] the 
Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in 
ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development or that 
of his or her family.”  Id. at 699.  The religious nonprofits make no such claim.  Little 
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell 794 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10th 
Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 
(2015), and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).  They do not seek “to dictate 
the conduct of the Government’s internal procedures”; rather, they seek RFRA’s 
protection from “[c]ertain forms of governmental compulsion,” namely, the detailed 
notice procedures that force the religious nonprofits on pain of significant financial 
penalties to facilitate and to enable their policies and infrastructure to be used to pro-
vide coverage that violates their sincerely held religious beliefs.  Roy, 476 U.S. at 
700. 
 253. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 
(1988). 
 254. Id. at 449. 
 255. Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 673–74 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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of DNA information did not violate the plaintiff’s free exercise rights because 
the government program did not require him “to modify his religious behav-
ior in any way – it involves no action or forbearance on his part, nor does it 
otherwise interfere with any religious act in which he engages.”256 
Furthermore, the conscientious objector example discussed in Notre 
Dame257 and Little Sisters of the Poor258 suffers from the same problem and, 
therefore, is inapposite.  The circuit court majority invokes a conscientious 
objector in an attempt to show why the Accommodation does not substantial-
ly burden the religious beliefs of the nonprofits.259  Even if the objector sin-
cerely believes that “he will be morally responsible” and “his religious exer-
cise will be substantially burdened” if someone is substituted for him, RFRA 
does not permit him to be exempted and to preclude the government’s draft-
ing a substitute.260  The religious nonprofits, so the argument goes, make the 
same claim: they object to the government’s finding a substitute to provide 
the required contraceptive and sterilization coverage, even though the Ac-
commodation enables them to opt-out of providing such coverage.261 
The problem, however, is that an accommodation removes a substantial 
burden only if it actually accommodates the particular adherent’s sincerely 
held religious beliefs.262  In Judge Hamilton’s hypothetical, the exemption 
from service accommodates the religious objector because he does not have 
to take an action (serving in the military) that violates his religious beliefs.263  
The draft exemption does not require him to take any further actions and, 
consequently, does not infringe on the exercise of his religious beliefs.264  
That is, in the words of Roy, the draft exemption does not “affirmatively 
compel [conscientious objectors], by threat of sanctions, to refrain from reli-
giously motivated conduct or to engage in conduct that they find objectiona- 
 256. Id. at 679. 
 257. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 623 (7th Cir. 2015) (Hamil-
ton, J., concurring), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016). 
 258. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 
1151, 1183–84 (2015), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. 
Ct. 445 (2015), and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
 259. Id. at 1192. 
 260. Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 623 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
 261. See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (“If a religious nonprofit chooses not to pay for contraceptive services, it 
is true that someone else may have a legal obligation to pay for them, just as someone 
may have to go to war in place of the conscientious objector.  But the obligation to 
provide contraceptive services, like the obligation to serve in the Armed Forces, arises 
not from the filing of the form but from the underlying law and regulations.”). 
 262. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862–63 (2015) (“[T]he protection of 
RLUIPA . . . is ‘not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a 
religious sect.’” (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707, 715–16 (1981))). 
 263. Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 623 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
 264. Id. 
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ble for religious reasons.”265  A person may object to war generally, but such 
a general disagreement with government policy does not “identify any coer-
cion directed at the practice or exercise of [his] religious beliefs.”266 
The religious nonprofits, though, are in a very different position.  Under 
the Accommodation, the government does not simply go out and find a sub-
stitute to provide contraception and sterilization coverage; rather, the gov-
ernment requires the petitioners to take a specific action that identifies the 
substitute that will provide the objectionable coverage to exactly those indi-
viduals whom the nonprofits refused to cover for religious reasons.  Provid-
ing this notice, though, violates the petitioners’ sincerely held religious be-
liefs.  As a result, the conscientious objector example provides an apt analogy 
only if the government requires the person receiving the draft exemption ei-
ther to identify specific individuals in his community who could serve as a 
substitute (and the objector has a sincere religious belief that precludes his 
doing so) or to suffer disciplinary action (such as a fine or incarceration) if he 
refuses to identify possible substitutes.  Although the government has a right 
to draft a substitute, it has no right to coerce conscientious objectors to take 
an action that substantially burdens their sincerely held religious belief (un-
less, of course, the government can satisfy strict scrutiny). 
The analogy breaks down even more when one considers the petition-
ers’ claim that providing notice under the Accommodation also forces them 
to support indefinitely the substitute’s conduct by maintaining its health plan, 
the infrastructure of which the substitute employs to distribute contraceptives 
to the petitioners’ employees.267  Thus, to be analogous, in addition to supply-
ing possible names of the substitute, the conscientious objector would have to 
maintain an ongoing relationship with his substitute, providing information 
and logistical support related to the substitute’s military service. 
The fact that the draft act might be the legal cause of a substitute’s being 
drafted does not remove the moral complicity of one who sincerely believes 
that identifying (and continuing to support) eligible substitutes violates his 
religious beliefs.  Moreover, focusing on the legal cause serves to shift the 
attention away from the primary question under RFRA’s substantial burden 
prong – whether the government imposes a substantial burden on religious 
adherents who refuse to take a government-mandated action that conflicts 
with their sincerely held religious beliefs.  The government’s focus on the 
legal cause of the insurance issuers’ and TPAs’ obligation to provide cover-
age obfuscates the proper question under RFRA regarding moral complicity: 
“[W]hether the HHS mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of  
 265. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986). 
 266. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971). 
 267. See Joint Appendix Vol. III of III at 1216–17, 1220–21, Zubik v. Burwell, 
136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-
191), 2016 WL 94224, at *1216–17, *1220–21 (stating that Petitioner Guidestone’s 
TPA would facilitate abortifiacient coverage by using its plan infrastructure to contact 
plan participants, identify participants by “payroll location,” and perform “[o]ngoing, 
nightly feeds” of information). 
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the objecting parties to conduct business in accordance with their religious 
beliefs.”268  Whether the government has imposed a substantial burden (such 
as a penalty or other serious consequences) on the religious nonprofits that 
precludes them from operating their businesses in accordance with their reli-
gious beliefs is left to the courts.  Whether an action is in accord with the 
beliefs of the religious nonprofits is left to the religious adherents to deter-
mine, not the courts.  The courts have the responsibility and authority to in-
terpret the law but are disqualified from deciding what actions violate the 
nonprofits’ sincerely held religious beliefs. 
B.  Deferring to a Religious Adherent’s Sincere Beliefs and Claims 
About What Burdens Those Beliefs Does Not Conflate the Plaintiff’s 
Burdens Under RFRA 
The government and the lower courts address the wrong question 
(“whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable”),269 
because they misunderstand the burden-shifting framework under RFRA.  
While the lower courts readily defer to a petitioner’s characterization of its 
religious beliefs,270 they reject the religious adherent’s claim that the Ac-
commodation’s notice provision contravenes those beliefs (i.e., that signing 
the Form 700 or giving notice makes them morally complicit in providing the 
objectionable contraception coverage).  According to the lower courts, even 
though a court must “accept[] a litigant’s sincerely held religious beliefs, it 
must assess the nature of a claimed burden on religious exercise to determine 
whether, as an objective legal matter, that burden is ‘substantial’ under 
RFRA.”271  On this view, to defer to a religious nonprofit’s claim that a law  
 268. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014).  See 
also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981) 
(“Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed 
by a religious faith, . . . thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify 
his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.  While the com-
pulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substan-
tial.”). 
 269. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778. 
 270. See, e.g., Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 
229, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Plaintiffs are correct that they – and not this Court – de-
termine what religious observance their faith commands.”), cert. granted sub nom. 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), and cert. 
granted sub nom. Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 446 
(2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per 
curiam). 
 271. Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207, 217 (2d Cir. 2015), 
vacated, No. 15-1100, 2016 WL 816249 (U.S. May 23, 2016); Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y 
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 442 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding 
that because the court “dispelled the notion that the self-certification procedure is 
burdensome, [it] need not consider whether the burden is substantial”), cert. granted 
in part sub nom. Zubik II, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva 
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substantially burdens its exercise of religion would collapse the substantial 
burden inquiry into the sincerity of belief inquiry, permitting religious adher-
ents to trigger strict scrutiny review of any federal law or policy.272 
What the lower courts fail to appreciate is that under the Supreme 
Court’s religious exercise cases, a religious objector has the burden to show 
three things: (1) that she has a sincere religious belief, (2) that the govern-
ment is requiring the adherent to take an action that she sincerely believes 
contravenes her religious belief, and (3) that the government is coercing or 
forcing her to take that action, thereby imposing a “substantial” burden on her 
religious exercise.  In Hobby Lobby, the Greens and the Hans sincerely be-
lieved that (1) “life begins at conception” and (2) “it would violate their reli-
gion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after 
that point.”273  The Court expressly held that “it is not for us to say that their 
religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.”274  That is, contrary to the 
lower courts’ analyses, the Supreme Court refused to say that their religious 
views were wrong (that life began sometime after conception) or that provid-
ing insurance coverage did not contradict or burden their beliefs.275  Instead, 
the Court deferred to the plaintiffs’ expressed beliefs (stating that there was 
“no dispute” that they had an “honest conviction”) and concluded that the 
ACA imposed a substantial burden because the penalties under the ACA 
“force[d] them to pay an enormous sum of money” if they adhered to their 
sincere religious beliefs.276 
The closely held companies in Hobby Lobby drew the “burden” line at 
providing coverage for contraceptives that they believed functioned as aborti-
facients.277  The petitioners, however, draw the line more broadly to also in-
clude giving notice under the Accommodation.278  They sincerely believe 
both that (1) providing, facilitating, or enabling coverage for contraceptive 
and sterilization services (either directly or through their insurance issuers or  
Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik 
III, 136 S. Ct. at 1557. 
 272. See Catholic Health Care Sys., 796 F.3d at 218 (“If RFRA plaintiffs needed 
only to assert that their religious beliefs were substantially burdened, federal courts 
would be reduced to rubber stamps, and the government would have to defend innu-
merable actions under demanding strict scrutiny analysis.”); Little Sisters of the Poor 
Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1176 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(“[A]ccepting any burden alleged by Plaintiffs as ‘substantial’ would improperly 
conflate the determination that a religious belief is sincerely held with the determina-
tion that a law or policy substantially burdens religious exercise.”), cert. granted sub 
nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and cert. granted in part, 
136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. at 
1557. 
 273. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766. 
 274. Id. at 2779. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 2759. 
 278. Id. at 2790. 
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TPAs) is morally wrong and (2) giving the notice under the Accommodation 
makes them morally complicit in providing such coverage.279  Under the 
Court’s RFRA analysis, though, courts cannot decide whether petitioners’ 
sincere belief (that giving notice “lies on the forbidden side of the line”) is 
“mistaken or insubstantial.”280  All courts are authorized to do is to decide 
whether the federal law or policy imposes a substantial burden that effective-
ly forces religious adherents to take an action that they sincerely believe is 
sinful.281 
Yet deferring to religious objectors regarding the sincerity of their reli-
gious beliefs, as well as whether a required action burdens those beliefs, nei-
ther conflates the sincere belief and substantial burden inquiries nor subjects 
all federal policies to strict scrutiny.  Courts still must determine (1) whether 
the petitioners are asserting a sincere religious belief or a mere pretext,282 (2) 
whether the government is requiring the petitioners to take an action that bur-
dens their exercise of religion,283 and (3) whether the consequences for not 
taking the required action constitute a substantial burden.284  Accordingly, 
deferring to petitioners does not obviate the role of the courts under RFRA’s 
burden-shifting framework; rather, it ensures that courts will not do what the 
lower courts did in the current cases – overstep their judicial role by telling 
religious plaintiffs that their beliefs about what constitutes sinful action are 
wrong, unreasonable, or misguided. 
 
 279. Id. at 2766. 
 280. Id. at 2779.  See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339–40 (1970) 
(explaining in the conscientious objector context that “religious beliefs” include be-
liefs that are “intensely personal convictions which some might find incomprehensi-
ble or incorrect” and that “impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from 
participating in” the action mandated by the government). 
 281. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 282. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (“A way of life, however virtu-
ous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of 
education if it is based on purely secular considerations; . . . the claims must be rooted 
in religious belief.”).  See also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (noting that “a corpo-
ration’s pretextual assertion of a religious belief in order to obtain an exemption for 
financial reasons would fail”). 
 283. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (rejecting plaintiffs’ free 
exercise claims because they were “unable to identify any coercion directed at the 
practice or exercise of their religious beliefs”).  See also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988) (requiring plaintiffs to show that 
a government program has a “tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to 
their religious beliefs” to trigger strict scrutiny). 
 284. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (concluding that a prisoner who 
showed he was required to shave his beard in violation of sincere religious beliefs or 
“face serious disciplinary action” had “easily satisfied [his] obligation” to establish a 
substantial burden). 
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Moreover, this deference is wholly consistent with the deference given 
to plaintiffs in the First Amendment expressive association context.285  In Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale, the Boy Scouts claimed that New Jersey’s public 
accommodations law, which the Supreme Court of New Jersey interpreted to 
require the Boy Scouts to readmit a scout leader who was “an avowed homo-
sexual and gay rights activist,” violated the Boy Scouts’ right of expressive 
association.286  Foreshadowing the lower courts’ reasoning in the present 
cases, the Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded “that Dale’s membership 
does not violate the Boy Scouts’ right of expressive association because his 
inclusion would not ‘affect in any significant way [the Boy Scouts’] existing 
members’ ability to carry out their various purposes.’”287 
On appeal, the Supreme Court clarified the standard for forced associa-
tion claims: “The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes 
the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person 
affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private 
viewpoints.”288  Under this standard, courts must consider two things: 
(1) “whether the group engages in ‘expressive association’” and (2) “whether 
the forced inclusion of Dale . . . would significantly affect the Boy Scouts’ 
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”289  Because the Boy Scouts 
sought to convey a system of values, it was “indisputable that [the Boy 
Scouts] engage[d] in expressive activity.”290 
Turning to the second prong, the Court split the significant burden in-
quiry into two subparts: (1) whether the Boy Scouts expressed a view about 
homosexuality, and, if so, (2) “whether Dale’s presence as an assistant 
scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy Scouts’ desire to not ‘pro-
mote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.’”291  The Su-
preme Court of New Jersey looked beyond the Boy Scouts’ expressed views 
on homosexuality and determined that the exclusion of members based on 
 
 285. The Court has acknowledged that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause embraces a 
freedom of conscience and worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of 
the First Amendment.”  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992).  As a result, that 
the Court evaluates an expressive association’s claims about its beliefs and what vio-
lates those beliefs with the same deference as a religious adherent’s claim about what 
it sincerely believes and which government-mandated actions violate those beliefs is 
not surprising.  In the free speech and free exercise contexts, “A state-created ortho-
doxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole as-
surance that religious faith [or a group’s political or social position] is real, not im-
posed.”  Id. at 592. 
 286. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). 
 287. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1225 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Bd. of 
Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987)), rev’d, 530 
U.S. 640 (2000). 
 288. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
 289. Id. at 648, 650. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 653. 
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sexual orientation actually was “inconsistent” with the organization’s com-
mitment to a “diverse and representative membership” and “appear[ed] anti-
thetical to the organization’s goals and philosophy.”292 
The Court, consistent with its reasoning in Hobby Lobby, rejected the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey’s analysis and disclaimed the ability “of the 
courts to reject a group’s expressed values because they disagree with those 
values or find them internally inconsistent.”293  In support of this position, 
Dale expressly invoked Thomas’s admonition that “religious beliefs need not 
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to 
merit First Amendment protection.”294  When evaluating “the sincerity of the 
professed beliefs,” the “limited extent” of the Court’s inquiry required it to 
defer to the organization’s professed beliefs: “We accept the Boy Scouts’ 
assertion.  We need not inquire further to determine the nature of the Boy 
Scouts’ expression with respect to homosexuality.”295 
Moreover, the Court gave the same level of deference to the Boy 
Scouts’ expressed views when deciding whether the forced inclusion of Dale 
would significantly burden its message regarding homosexuality: “As we 
give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its ex-
pression, we must also give deference to an association’s view of what would 
impair its expression.”296  The members of an expressive association, like the 
members of a religious group, have a “right to choose to send one message 
but not the other.”297  Such deference is important in the speech and free ex-
ercise contexts because it prevents courts from substituting their views (about 
social issues or religious beliefs) for the professed beliefs of the organization.  
As a result, given that New Jersey’s public accommodations law would force 
the Boy Scouts to alter its message, the Court held that “the forced inclusion 
of Dale would significantly affect its expression.”298 
In Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Fol-
lette, the Court mandated the same level of deference to an association’s rules 
for seating delegates at its national convention.299  The State of Wisconsin 
passed a law that opened its Democratic Presidential preference primary to all 
voters, even those who did not publicly declare their party affiliation.300  This 
alone did not violate the right of association of the Democratic Party of the 
United States (the “National Party”).301  But Wisconsin also sought to require 
the National Party to honor the binding primary results and to seat the Wis- 
 292. Id. at 650–51. 
 293. Id. at 651. 
 294. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
 295. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650–51. 
 296. Id. at 653. 
 297. Id. at 656. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 123–24 
(1981). 
 300. Id. at 110–11. 
 301. Id. at 112. 
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consin delegation at the National Party’s national convention, even though 
Wisconsin’s delegates were chosen in a way that violated the National Party’s 
rules.302  On appeal, Wisconsin argued that its open primary law “places only 
a minor burden on the National Party.”303  The National Party, in response, 
contended “that the burden is substantial, because it prevents the Party from 
‘screen[ing] out those whose affiliation is . . . slight, tenuous, or fleeting,’ and 
that such screening is essential to build a more effective and responsible Par-
ty.”304  Instead of entering the fray and objectively assessing the National 
Party’s beliefs, the Supreme Court deferred to the National Party, disclaiming 
the authority to resolve the dispute: “[I]t is not for the courts to mediate the 
merits of this dispute.  For even if the State were correct, a State, or a court, 
may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of the Party.”305 
According to La Follette, deference was required even if the “State were 
correct” – i.e., even if “the public avowal of party affiliation required” by the 
National Party’s rules “provides no more assurance of party loyalty than” 
Wisconsin’s requiring “a person to vote in no more than one party’s prima-
ry.”306  Yet even assuming that the National Party’s rules were predicated on 
a false belief, the National Party retained the exclusive right to determine its 
methods for selecting its members: “[T]he stringency, and wisdom, of mem-
bership requirements is for the association and its members to decide – not 
the courts.”307  Prefiguring Dale’s invocation of Thomas, the Court acknowl-
edged that all First Amendment freedoms warrant such deference: “[A]s is 
true of all expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not in-
terfere on the ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or irra-
tional.”308 
Just as the right of expressive association protects against the govern-
ment’s dictating to groups what their views are and which messages they can 
propound,309 RFRA does the same thing regarding a religious believer’s exer-
cise of religion – it prevents the government from telling adherents what their 
beliefs are and when they are violated.310  Furthermore, deferring to sincerely 
held beliefs ensures that the exercise of religion is “broadly construed” con-
 
 302. Id. at 120. 
 303. Id. at 123. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 123–24. 
 306. Id. at 123 n.25. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 124. 
 309. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 
557, 575 (1995) (“But whatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker 
not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond 
the government’s power to control.”). 
 310. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014) (“[I]t 
is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.”). 
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sistent with RFRA’s requirements.311  It is not surprising, then, that the Su-
preme Court has given broad deference to religious adherents regarding the 
sincerity of their beliefs, as well as their determination that government-
mandated actions conflict with these beliefs.  Consistent with the Court’s 
treatment of the right of expressive association, courts “must not be[] guided 
by [their] views of whether the [religious objector’s] teachings with respect to 
[a specific issue] are right or wrong.”312 
Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the lower courts are correct – that 
the ACA is the legal cause of insurance issuers and TPAs providing contra-
ceptive and sterilization coverage – under Hobby Lobby, Dale, and La Fol-
lette, “a court[] may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that 
of the” religious adherent that sincerely believes providing notice under the 
Accommodation (thereby enabling coverage for morally objectionable ser-
vices and establishing an ongoing relationship with the provider of such ser-
vices) contradicts its religious beliefs.313  Even if a court thinks a petitioner’s 
view (that a religious nonprofit can be morally complicit in wrongdoing even 
if the court declares that it is not the legal cause of the coverage) is “unwise” 
or “irrational,” the court “may not interfere” because the religious tenets 
“[are] for the [religious] association and its members to decide – not the 
courts.”314 
In fact, to hold otherwise would sanction a variation of the govern-
ment’s “too attenuated” argument in Hobby Lobby, an argument the Supreme 
Court rejected because it impermissibly told “the plaintiffs that their beliefs 
[were] flawed.”315  In Hobby Lobby, the government argued “that the connec-
tion between what the objecting parties must do (provide health-insurance 
coverage for four methods of contraception that may operate after the fertili-
zation of an egg) and the end that they find to be morally wrong (destruction 
of an embryo) is simply too attenuated.”316  According to the government, 
providing coverage would not in and of itself destroy any embryo; an embryo 
would be destroyed only if an employee used one of the challenged methods 
of contraception.317 
The lower courts make the same general argument.  In their view, the 
connection between what the religious nonprofits must do (provide notice 
under the Accommodation) and the end they believe is morally wrong (facili-
tating, enabling, or providing coverage for contraceptive and sterilization 
services) is too far removed because the ACA, not the provision of notice, is  
 311. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
3(g) (2012) (mandating that the exercise of religion “be construed in favor of a broad 
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this 
chapter and the Constitution”). 
 312. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000). 
 313. Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 123–24. 
 314. Id. at 123 n.25. 
 315. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778. 
 316. Id. at 2777. 
 317. Id. 
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the legal cause of the coverage.318  But as in Hobby Lobby, the religious non-
profits sincerely “believe that providing the [notice] demanded by the [Ac-
commodation] is connected to the [provision of contraceptive coverage and, 
therefore, the] destruction of an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make it 
immoral for them to provide the [notice].”319  Although courts can determine 
whether the government has coerced religious adherents into acting contrary 
to “their religious beliefs,”320 courts cannot do what the lower courts did here 
– tell the religious believers that their views regarding moral complicity are 
flawed, wrong, inconsistent, or irrational:  
 
This belief implicates a difficult and important question of religion 
and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is 
wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself [e.g., 
signing a form] but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the 
commission of an immoral act by another [e.g., the provision of 
coverage for contraceptive and sterilization services].321   
 
Contrary to the conclusion of the lower courts, courts are disqualified from 
assessing the veracity or reasonableness of such beliefs.322 
IV.  COURTS LACK THE AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE TO DECIDE 
RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS REGARDING WHICH 
ACTIONS MAKE RELIGIOUS ADHERENTS COMPLICIT IN 
WRONGDOING UNDER THEIR FAITHS 
The lower courts contend that they “must . . . objectively assess whether 
the appellees’ compliance with the self-certification procedure does, in fact, 
trigger, facilitate, or make them complicit in the provision of contraceptive 
coverage” but must do so “[w]ithout testing the appellees’ religious be-
liefs.”323  The lower courts claim the right (and duty) to tell religious believ-
 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 2778. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) 
(“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not 
presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim.”), superseded by stat-
ute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012), as 
recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015); Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the judicial ken to question the 
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular liti-
gants’ interpretations of those creeds.”). 
 323. Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 
435 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part sub nom. Zubik II, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), 
and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and va-
cated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
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ers whether a government-mandated action actually makes them complicit in 
conduct that violates their sincere religious beliefs.324  Yet while instructing 
the faithful, courts are not supposed to “test” those beliefs.325  The problem 
with this view is that it requires courts to do incompatible things (like draw-
ing a figure that is both a square and a circle): objectively assess whether an 
action (e.g., giving notice under the Accommodation) makes a religious ad-
herent complicit in wrongdoing without “testing” that person’s sincere reli-
gious belief that the action does make her complicit in sin.  In the religious 
nonprofit cases, the lower courts not only have tested the sincere beliefs of 
organizations, but also have told them that their beliefs failed the test – that 
the Accommodation does not really make them morally culpable despite their 
sincere beliefs to the contrary.326 
Although the courts are the last arbiters of legal questions, they should 
play no role regarding such ecclesiastical issues.327  The lower courts have 
asserted an unprecedented and dangerous right to instruct the faithful about 
which actions actually violate their beliefs.  But there are good reasons why 
courts are precluded from dictating the scope of moral culpability.  One need 
look no further than the lower courts’ “Pontius Pilate” defense to see the 
problem when courts assume ecclesiastical authority and pass judgment on 
the moral and religious claims of adherents. 
According to the lower courts, religious nonprofits cannot even establish 
that their religious beliefs are burdened, let alone substantially burdened, 
because the Accommodation “washes away” their complicity in any alleged 
moral wrongdoing: “The accommodation in this case consists in the organiza-
tion’s . . . washing its hands of any involvement in contraceptive coverage, 
and the insurer and the third-party administrator taking up the slack under 
compulsion of federal law.”328 
Although Pontius Pilate disavowed personal responsibility by washing 
his hands, for at least some (including Pilate’s wife), that official action did 
not remove his complicity in a grave moral wrong.329  That the courts now 
tell the religious nonprofits that the Accommodation washes away their moral 
complicity in facilitating or enabling coverage for contraceptives does not 
 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 422. 
 327. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699 (“It is not within the judicial ken to question 
the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular 
litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”). 
 328. Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 441 (quoting Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 
743 F.3d 547, 557 (7th Cir. 2014), vacated sub nom. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 
135 S. Ct. 1528 (2015)); id. at 438–39 (“[T]he submission of the self-certification 
form does not make the appellees ‘complicit’ in the provision of contraceptive cover-
age.  If anything, because the appellees specifically state on the self-certification form 
that they object on religious grounds to providing such coverage, it is a declaration 
that they will not be complicit in providing coverage.”). 
 329. Matthew 27:24. 
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assuage their sincere belief that giving notice violates their faith.  Even if 
giving notice under the Accommodation declares that a religious nonprofit 
does not want to provide coverage directly, it does not – and cannot – control 
the moral complicity issue any more than Pilate’s ceremonial act resolved the 
issue regarding his moral culpability.  Rather, contrary to the lower courts’ 
contention, the religious nonprofit cases declare that the petitioners sincerely 
believe that giving notice makes them complicit.330  And no court has chal-
lenged the sincerity of that belief. 
To contend otherwise, as the lower courts have done, is to assume the 
mantle of a religious authority, arrogating the power to determine (1) whether 
a sincerely held religious belief is reasonable or consistent331 and (2) whether 
such a belief is actually burdened.  But the Supreme Court repeatedly has 
stated that in the “sensitive area” of religious belief, “it is not within the judi-
cial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or [the 
courts] more correctly perceive[] the commands of [the plaintiff’s] faith” 
because “[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”332  Allowing 
courts to weigh in on the nature of a religious belief, and the extent to which a 
particular belief is actually burdened, threatens to conflate the religious and 
secular realms, giving courts the ability to tell religious adherents whether 
they correctly determined that a government-mandated action violated their 
beliefs.  But courts lack such power because, as the Founders acknowledged, 
the legal and the spiritual realms must remain distinct: “No distinction seems 
to be more obvious than that between spiritual and temporal matters.  Yet 
whenever they have been made objects of Legislation, they have clashed and 
contended with each other, till one or the other has gained the supremacy.”333 
 
 330. See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver v. Burwell, 794 
F.3d 1151, 1180 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Bur-
well, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015), and cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015), and 
vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik III, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
 331. See id. at 1178 n.25 (stating that the “plaintiffs have not convincingly ex-
plained how the notice to HHS promulgated by the Departments would substantially 
burden their religious exercise but the notice crafted by the Supreme Court does not”). 
 332. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).  
See also Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990) 
(“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not 
presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of 
a religious claim.”). 
 333. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct-Nov. 1787), in 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 77, 79  (Ralph Ketchum ed., 2006).  See also 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Vol. 
2, 630–32 (5th ed. 1891) (“The real object of the [First] [A]mendment was, not to 
countenance, much less to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by pros-
trating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent 
any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclu-
sive patronage of the national government.  It thus cut off the means of religious per-
secution, (the vice and pest of former ages), and of the subversion of the rights of 
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As the Court confirmed in Hobby Lobby, “the federal courts have no 
business addressing . . . difficult and important question[s] of religion and 
moral philosophy.”334  Yet determining when and under what circumstances a 
religious believer is complicit in wrongdoing presents the courts with a para-
digmatic question of religion and moral philosophy.335  Consequently, reli-
gious organizations (and even particular individuals, given that idiosyncratic 
beliefs are protected) must serve as the last arbiters of what their sincerely 
held religious beliefs are and whether those beliefs are countermanded by a 
government-mandated action or policy. 
As Thomas demonstrates, courts have only a limited role when consider-
ing a plaintiff’s professed religious beliefs.  In Thomas, the Indiana Supreme 
Court concluded that Thomas’s position – that he could produce the raw ma-
terials needed to build tanks but not specific parts of the tanks – was incon-
sistent and reflected a “personal philosophical choice rather than a religious 
choice.”336  The Supreme Court rejected the state supreme court’s analysis, 
holding that Thomas – and not the courts – had the right to determine whether 
particular actions made him morally complicit: “But Thomas’ statements 
reveal no more than that he found work in the roll foundry sufficiently insu-
lated from producing weapons of war.  We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a 
line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable 
one.”337  The “substantial” burden resulted from the denial of unemployment 
benefits, not an objective determination by the Court that working directly on 
the production of tanks actually made Thomas “chargeable in . . . con-
science.”338  In fact, the Court expressly denied having the authority to decide 
whether a particular religious objector properly believes that an action would 
make him morally culpable.339 
Similarly, in Holt, the Court rejected a lower court’s attempt to make an 
allegedly objective determination as to whether the Arkansas Department of 
Corrections’s “no beard” policy actually burdened the plaintiff’s religious 
beliefs.340  The lower court (1) denied that shaving his beard really burdened 
the prisoner’s religious exercise because he had access to a variety of other 
means of religious practice; (2) determined that the burden was “slight” be-
cause his religion “would ‘credit’ him for attempting to follow his religious 
 
conscience in matters of religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the days 
of the Apostles to the present age.”). 
 334. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
 335. See Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 566 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Flaum, J., dissenting) (“Yet we are judges, not moral philosophers or theologians; 
this is not a question of legal causation but of religious faith.”), vacated sub nom. 
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 1528 (2015). 
 336. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. 
Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (Ind. 1979), rev’d, 450 U.S. at 707). 
 337. Id. at 715. 
 338. Id. (quoting Thomas, 391 N.E.2d at 1131). 
 339. Id. at 716. 
 340. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 866 (2015). 
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beliefs, even if that attempt proved unsuccessful;” and (3) relied on the fact 
that not all Muslims believe that men must grow beards.341  The unanimous 
Court rejected each part of the district court’s analysis, protecting the right of 
religious adherents to determine what their beliefs are without having to look 
over their shoulders to see if courts agree.342  Given that the Department did 
not dispute the sincerity of the prisoner’s belief, all a court could do under 
RFRA’s substantial burden prong was to consider whether the “no beard” 
policy put the plaintiff to the choice “to ‘engage in conduct that seriously 
violate[ed] [his] religious beliefs’” or to contravene that policy and “face 
serious disciplinary action.”343 
If a religious nonprofit asserts a sincerely held belief that performing a 
certain action required by law is sinful, then the courts lack the authority to 
tell the religious nonprofit that its views are wrong.  While courts can assess 
whether the penalty imposed for failing to take the required action is substan-
tial, under the Supreme Court’s precedents, they cannot tell a religious practi-
tioner that its views are misguided or inconsistent, regardless of how novel, 
strange, or contradictory those views might seem to the court.344  Consequent-
ly, the circuit court majority got the analysis wrong the first time around be-
cause it told the petitioners “that their beliefs are flawed.”  On remand from 
the Supreme Court, the lower courts should apply the proper standard and 
find that the burden is substantial because the religious nonprofits confront 
the same penalties as Hobby Lobby and Conestoga if the religious nonprofits 
“conduct business in accordance with their religious beliefs.”345 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Given that Smith permits the government to pass neutral, generally ap-
plicable laws, even if those laws impose significant burdens on religious ex-
ercise, determining the proper scope of protection afforded the exercise of 
religion under RFRA is critically important.  The majority of circuit courts 
have claimed the authority to tell religious adherents whether and when a 
government-mandated action contravenes their sincerely held religious be-
liefs.  In so doing, the lower courts have assumed the mantle of a religious 
authority, telling religious nonprofits that their sincerely held religious beliefs 
are inconsistent with the courts’ conclusion that the Accommodation removes 
any complicity in sin.  Such a claim not only contradicts the substantial bur-
den analysis in Hobby Lobby and Holt, but it also ignores the Court’s ad-
monition that “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of 
 
 341. Id. at 862. 
 342. Id. at 867. 
 343. Id. at 862 (second alteration in original). 
 344. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (recognizing that “religious beliefs need not be 
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First 
Amendment protection”). 
 345. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
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particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ 
interpretations of those creeds.”346  As a result, courts (on remand in the reli-
gious nonprofit cases and in other RFRA cases) should recognize that under 
RFRA’s substantial burden standard, they lack the authority and competence 
to pass judgment on the veracity or consistency of the free exercise claims of 
religious adherents.  Where, as in the religious nonprofit cases, the govern-
ment forces religious adherents to violate their sincerely held beliefs or suffer 
serious penalties or discipline, the government should bear the burden of sat-






 346. Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). 
 347. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864. 
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